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Patent Nationalism and the Case 
for a New U.S. Patent Working Requirement 
Timothy T. Lau* 
A working requirement is a provision of intellectual property law that 
uses the threat of punishment to encourage holders to “work” their 
intellectual property. This Article examines the case for adding a working 
requirement to U.S. patent law. It explains that, given the current global 
trends in economic and technological development, a working requirement 
that increases the exposure of Americans to new technologies through the 
manufacture of inventions is necessary for the U.S. patent system to fulfill 
its constitutional purpose, specifically, “[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and Useful Arts.” To that end, this Article analyzes elements of work-
ing requirements in foreign patent laws to identify specific features that 
should be incorporated within a new U.S. working requirement. It also 
addresses how to structure the working requirement to prevent potential 
abuse and presents a law and economics analysis as to how the require-
ment can be used to encourage manufacturing in the United States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A patent is the grant of a monopoly over an invention. But a 
patent represents a quid pro quo. As the Supreme Court has 
explained, “The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the 
creation of society—at odds with the inherent free nature of 
disclosed ideas—and was not to be freely given.”1 In subjecting a 
patent monopoly over itself, the public gets something in return. 
What the public should receive in return is a subject of endless 
debate. However, there has not been an urgent need in recent times 
to deeply examine the fundamental purpose of the U.S. patent 
system. After all, from the end of the Cold War to today, the United 
States undisputedly is the predominant global economic and 
inventive power. It seems silly to question whether the U.S. patent 
system is doing enough for the public when the United States is 
leading the world in technology and innovation. 
 
 1. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). 
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But the competitors of the United States have been catching up. 
The 2017 edition of “Global Trends,” a text prepared by the 
National Intelligence Council for the President every four years, 
provides this assessment of the United States in the changing 
global dynamics: 
 Economic, technological, and security trends are increasing the 
number of states that can exert geopolitical influence, bringing the 
unipolar post-Cold War period to a close. The economic progress 
of the past century has widened the number of states—Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, and Turkey—with material 
claims to great and middle power status. . . . Even with profound 
uncertainties regarding the future of global economic growth, 
leading forecasters broadly agree that emerging market econo-
mies like China and India will contribute a much larger share of 
global GDP than is currently the case—shifting the focus of the 
world’s economic activity eastward.2 
The U.S. intelligence apparatus itself admits that the Pax Americana 
is at an end. Even now, the rivals of the United States are beginning 
to surpass the United States in terms of inventions and scientific 
research.3 The future promises only more challenges and competi-
tion for U.S. science and engineering. 
The reality is that the U.S. patent system, if left unchanged, will 
exact patent monopolies on Americans over an increasing number 
of inventions of which Americans play no part in their invention 
and play no part in their manufacture. And it is time to consider 
whether such a patent system is doing enough public good and, if 
it is not, what needs to be changed so that it can better serve the 
people of the United States. 
This Article makes the case that, in view of the global dynamics, a 
new, robust working requirement should be introduced into U.S. pat-
ent law. The Article begins with an examination of the fundamental 
 
 2. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS: PARADOX OF PROGRESS 26 (2017) 
(emphasis removed from original). 
 3. See, e.g., Press Release, Global Patent Applications Rose to 2.9 Million in 2015 on Strong 
Growth from China; Demand Also Increased for Other Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG. (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2016/article_ 
0017.html (“Chinese innovators filed the most patent applications (1,010,406) in 2015, 
followed by those from the United States of America (526,296) and Japan (454,285) . . . .”); 
Richard Van Noorden, China by the Numbers, 534 NATURE 452, 452–53 (2016), http://www 
.nature.com/news/china-by-the-numbers-1.20122. 
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purposes that patent law should serve. After exploring the dominant 
justifications for the U.S. patent system and their deficiencies in 
light of these changing times, it proposes a return to the 
nationalistic conception of patent law as a means to develop the 
national economy and state of science and technology, as the 
Framers of the Constitution envisioned when they explicitly armed 
Congress with the power to promulgate a patent law. 
This Article subsequently explains what a working requirement 
is through an exploration of the variants of the working require-
ment in foreign patent laws. It then sets forth how the particular 
species of working requirement that encourages the domestic 
manufacture of patented goods can help the U.S. patent system ful-
fill its original, intended function and how the working require-
ment may fit with the existing patent law and serve the industrial 
policy of the United States. 
The final section of this Article fleshes out the working require-
ment with policy details. It analyzes how the working requirement 
should be structured to prevent abuse and presents a law and eco-
nomics analysis as to when and how the working requirement can 
be applied. 
The discussion of such a working requirement is particularly 
timely given the Trump Administration’s “buy American and hire 
American” policy. While there has been much mention in the media 
about tariffs and trade deal renegotiation, little attention has been 
paid to how patent law should be adjusted to fit within these larger 
policy objectives. This omission is curious given the close relation-
ship between patent law and trade law; as the United States now 
embarks on a protectionist course, there ought to be a serious 
conversation about how patent law should work with trade law to 
increase manufacturing within the United States.4 Indeed, as this 
 
 4. The lack of any discussion on how to change patent law to increase manufacturing 
can be seen in the following statement President Trump was reported to have made in a 
meeting with his advisors: 
[Chief of Staff] John [Kelly], you haven’t been in a trade discussion before, so I 
want to share with you my views. For the last six months, this same group of 
geniuses comes in here all the time and I tell them, “Tariffs. I want tariffs.” And 
what do they do? They bring me IP. I can’t put a tariff on IP. 
Jonathan Swan, Exclusive: Trump Vents in Oval Office, “I Want Tariffs. Bring Me Some Tariffs!,” 
AXIOS (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.axios.com/exclusive-trump-vents-in-oval-office-i-want 
-tariffs-bring-me-some-tariffs-1513305111-5cba21a2-6438-429a-9377-30f6c4cf2e9e.html (pro-
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Article explains, there are reasons to think that a new patent 
working requirement is a more efficient and less drastic tool than 
tariffs in effectuating this overall policy goal. At the very least, the 
United States should consider a new patent working requirement 
before waging a trade war against its economic competitors. 
II. THE FUNCTION OF PATENT LAW 
To understand why a working requirement should be intro-
duced into patent law, it is important to understand the purpose of 
the U.S. patent system. I begin by examining the deficiencies of the 
justifications of patent systems currently advanced by U.S. scholars 
and then propose a return to the old, nationalistic conception of 
patent law. 
A. Current U.S. Justifications for the Patent System 
and Their Deficiencies 
In modern U.S. legal literature, there are four dominant theo-
retical justifications for the patent system: (A) incentive to invent, 
(B) disclosure, (C) commercialization, and (D) race to invent. The 
first of these has a long history, as reflected in these words in a 
correspondence from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison: “[T]he 
 
viding a partial transcription of the meeting which was not disputed by the White House). 
While it is indeed impossible to “put a tariff on IP,” when “tariff” is strictly understood in its 
legal sense, a patent working requirement is in effect “a tariff on IP.” The President’s 
statement that he “can’t put a tariff on IP” indicates that the “group of geniuses” and his 
other advisors have not informed him about the existence of such a policy option. 
It is also notable that, in the wake of the meeting, the President instructed the Trade 
Representative to launch an investigation of Chinese intellectual property theft, with the 
ultimate aim of imposing tariffs should a violation be found. Id.; USTR Announces Initiation 
of Section 301 Investigation of China, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr 
-announces-initiation-section; Jeff Mason, Exclusive: Trump Considers Big ‘Fine’ over China 
Intellectual Property Theft, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2018, 1:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/ar 
ticle/us-usa-trump-trade-exclusive/exclusive-trump-considers-big-fine-over-china-intellec 
tual-property-theft-idUSKBN1F62SR. Compared to using intellectual property as a way to 
generate tariffs, there have been very few discussions or policy proposals about changing 
intellectual property law itself as a direct measure to improve manufacturing. 
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incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a 
monopoly for a limited time . . . .”5 
In other words, a patent system motivates inventors to actually 
do inventive work through the heightened profits of a monopoly. 
In contrast, the disclosure justification treats the patent 
monopolies as bribes to inventors to disclose publicly what they 
otherwise would have kept as trade secrets. As the Supreme 
Court explained: 
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is 
circulated to the general public and those especially skilled in the 
trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are of such 
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is 
willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its 
disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas 
and the eventual development of further significant advances in 
the art.6 
The commercialization theory, according to Henry Smith, 
views “the role of the patent as a prospect, allowing the patent 
holder (who need not be the inventor) to take actions to raise the 
value of the patent prospect—for example, through further 
research or through marketing efforts.”7 As reflected in the title of 
Smith’s article, Intellectual Property as Property, the concept is built 
off of an idealization of rights to patents as something almost as 
strong as rights to physical property. 
Mark Lemley, through an examination of the histories of the 
most important inventions such as the steam engine, telephone, 
and airplane, has developed the concept of a race to invent as a 
justification for the patent system: 
It is possible that patents encourage putative inventors to race to 
achieve a result first, and in doing so get us a greater variety of 
inventions more quickly than we would have in the absence of 
patent protection. 
 
 5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in THE THOMAS 
JEFFERSON PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: SERIES 1: GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE, 1651–
1827, at 7070, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib003711. 
 6. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
 7. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Infor-
mation, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1815 (2007). 
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 . . . . 
 . . . [I]nventors aren’t driven by the lure of being a monopolist 
so much as by the risk of losing a race and being excluded from 
competition in that market.8 
The four theories all take the form of a grand theoretical 
justification of a patent system that is abstract, idealized, and 
universal. After all, none of these theories seek to account for the 
existence of competing national governments and their respective 
interests; they couch the benefits of patents in terms of some 
universal greater good.9 
The reality, however, is that there is no generalized patent 
system. It not only does not exist but cannot exist so long as there 
are sovereign nations with divergent interests. After all, patents are 
state-granted monopolies. Patents are not a necessary feature of 
sovereignty, but they cannot function in the absence of a sovereign 
power that backs the monopoly. Furthermore, the fundamental 
matter regulated by patents is technological development, which, 
in turn, is intrinsically tied to the ability of a nation to win in war 
and to compete in trade. Nations naturally inject their needs, 
ambitions, and interests into their patent laws.10 Thus, it seems 
absurd to discuss why patent systems exist by abstracting away the 
existence of nations. 
Accordingly, any theory that fails to explain patent systems 
with reference to a particular patent system and with reference to 
the strategic realities of the nation creating the system is inherently 
lacking, however elegant it may be. Each patent system should be 
justified with reference to the particular national government and 
with consideration of the circumstances and context of the national 
market the system is supposed to serve. Given that the four theories 
of incentive to invent, disclosure, commercialization, and race to 
 
 8. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 755 (2012). 
 9. From a broader perspective, the four justifications presented here and even the 
justification advanced within this Article of advancing the national state of scientific 
development fall under the umbrella of utilitarian justifications of intellectual property. A 
summary of other less prevalent theories is provided in Adam Moore & Ken Himma, 
Intellectual Property, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE (Mar. 8, 2011), https://plato 
.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/intellectual-property/. 
 10. As seen in the subsequent discussion, the working requirements adopted by the 
various nations reflect their own industrial objectives. 
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invent take no account of such contextual details as economics or 
state of development, they cannot justify all patent systems.  
Nonetheless, do these four theories at the least explain the need 
for a U.S. patent system? The answer is no. 
Let us first consider the three theories of incentive to invent, 
commercialization, and race to invent, all of which identify inno-
vation as the fundamental societal benefit. If they are to account for 
the existence of the U.S. patent system, then it must be the case that 
inventors desire, or actually require, the rewards of U.S. patent mo-
nopolies as motivation to invent or to commercialize inventions. 
All three are plausible justifications for the U.S. patent system 
so long as the United States remains the dominant economic and 
inventive power. But a conceptual difficulty arises when another 
market has surpassed the U.S. market to be the biggest and most 
attractive market. Why should the United States award monopoly 
rights to inventors who find their motivation to invent, commer-
cialize, or race through other foreign markets? 
It may be easier to consider the deficiencies of these three patent 
law justifications from another angle. In 2004, two years before the 
Islamic Courts Union imposed some form of a unified government 
over the nation, Somalia had nothing resembling national laws, 
much less a patent system. Yet residents of Mogadishu had access 
to high speed internet, and even remote areas of Somalia were 
online. Mobile phones were widely available, and Somalis enjoyed 
Hotmail service. There was even discussion of the installation of a 
3G network.11 Clearly, the lack of a Somali patent system inhibited 
neither the invention, the race to invent, nor the commercialization 
of all these telecommunications technologies.12 
Justifications for any Somali patent system therefore must lie 
elsewhere—because, in the globalized world, the sufficiency of 
incentive to invent, commercialization, and race to invent as justi-
fications for a given patent system is dependent on the strength of 
 
 11. Joseph Winter, Telecoms Thriving in Lawless Somalia, BBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2004, 
6:30 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4020259.stm. 
 12. It may be argued that a Somali patent system would have helped promote the 
invention of the telecommunications technologies in Somalia. But Somalis with access to the 
patent system of the Western nations and by extension to the profits of patent monopolies in 
the Western nations already have the motivation to do inventive work, whether they are 
incentivized to invent or whether they wish to race. Somalia clearly had not been an 
inventive power in recent times, but it was not for lack of a patent system. 
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the local market in relation to the world market. If the United States 
were to be supplanted by one or more of its competitors as the 
dominant global market, these three theories would lose their 
viability as justification for the U.S. patent system just as they could 
not now serve as justification for a Somali patent system. 
As the Supreme Court has noted in these oft-cited lines, “[A] 
patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and 
to the right to access to a free and open market,” whose “far-
reaching social and economic consequences . . . give the public a 
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept 
within their legitimate scope.”13 It is in the public interest to pro-
vide to inventors no more than is needed to motivate them to 
invent, commercialize, or race. If the competitors of the United 
States have provided all the necessary incentives, then there is no 
need for a U.S. patent system that subjects Americans to unneces-
sary patent monopolies. 
This danger that the United States will lose its position as the 
dominant market is very real; in fact, it could be argued that the 
United States is already no longer the dominant market for inno-
vative products. It is worthwhile to summarize some aspects of the 
key trends: 
• Automobiles. In 2009, the number of cars sold in China exceed-
ed that in the United States.14 In 2010, General Motors sold more 
cars in a foreign market, China, than in its home market.15 In 2016, 
General Motors delivered nearly 3.9 million vehicles in China, 30% 
more than the 3.0 million vehicles delivered in the United States.16 
 
 13. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). 
 14. Chris Hogg, China’s Car Industry Overtakes US, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2009, 7:52 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7879372.stm. 
 15. Jerry Hirsch, GM’s China Sales Top U.S. Total, A First for the Automaker, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 25, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/25/business/la-fi-autos-gm-20110125. 
 16. GENERAL MOTORS, GM U.S. DELIVERIES FOR DECEMBER 2016 (2016), https://www 
.gm.com/content/dam/gm/mol/docs/Deliveries-December-2016.pdf; General Motors Posts 
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• Semiconductors. As of 2011, China overtook the United States 
as the dominant smartphone market.17 At the end of 2015, there 
were estimated to be more than 131 million iPhones in use in China, 
about 20% more than the 110 million units in use within the 
United States.18 
• Internet and Internet Services. In 2009, China’s population of 
internet users reached 384 million, exceeding the entire population 
of the United States and establishing China as the largest online 
community.19 At the end of 2015, the number of internet users in 
China was more than double the entire population of the United 
States.20 As of October 2016, Uber and Lyft served roughly 80 
million rides in the United States per month.21 In contrast, Didi, the 
market leader in ride-sharing in China, clocks 20 million rides 
per day.22 
• Aviation. In terms of passenger numbers, China is expected 
to surpass the United States as the largest aviation market in 2024.23 
Boeing projects that, over the next two decades, the demand for 
airplanes within the Asia Pacific region will be worth $2.5 trillion, 
compared to $1.04 trillion for the North America market.24 
• Clean Energy. Since 2009, China has firmly and decisively 
seized the lead in clean energy investments, and its $54.4 billion 
worth of investments in 2010 is 60% larger than that of the United 
 
 17. Rhiannon Williams, World’s Biggest Smartphone Market Hits Saturation as Sales in 
China Fall for First Time, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 20, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
/technology/mobile-phones/11812322/smartphone-sales-in-china-fall-says-gartner.html. 
 18. Don Reisinger, Just How Popular is the iPhone in China?, FORTUNE (May 18, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/18/apple-iphone-china/. 
 19. China Internet Population Hits 384 Million, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2010, 2:12 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/15/china-internet-idUSTOE60E06S20100115. 
 20. Melanie Lee, China’s Nearly 700 Million Internet Users are Hot for Online Finance, 
FORBES (Jan. 25, 2016, 9:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/melanieleest/2016/01/25 
/chinas-nearly-700-million-internet-users-are-hot-for-online-finance/. 
 21. Kia Kokalitcheva, Lyft Will Complete 17 Million U.S. Rides This Month, FORTUNE 
(Oct. 25, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/25/lyft-17-million-rides/. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Chris Cooper, China to Surpass U.S. as World’s Largest Aviation Market by 2024, 
BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Oct. 20, 2016, 10:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles 
/2016-10-21/china-to-surpass-u-s-as-world-s-largest-aviation-market-by-2024. 
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States.25 As of this writing, China has the most wind energy, solar 
energy, and hydropower capacity in the world.26 
• Pharmaceuticals. In 2009, China was the fifth largest phar-
maceutical market.27 Today, China is the second.28 The U.S. De-
partment of Commerce projects that by 2020, the Chinese market 
will reach $315 billion, close to the forecasted $475 billion for the 
U.S. market.29 
Across areas of industry and innovation, which is the central 
concern of patent law, foreign markets—particularly China’s—are 
surpassing that of the United States in size and importance.  For 
many technology industry players, the Chinese market is already 
as significant as, if not more so than, the U.S. market.30 In light of 
similar, though more modest, trends from other emerging 
countries, it is doubtful on a long-term, 30- to 100-year horizon 
whether the U.S. market will even be needed to motivate inventors, 
who might come to value their foreign patents more than their U.S. 
patents because they profit more from marketing their inventions 
in these foreign markets.31 It is telling that, as of this writing, there 
are more patent applications filed at China’s patent office than 
those of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, combined.32 
 
 25. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., WHO’S WINNING THE CLEAN ENERGY RACE? 2010 
EDITION 11 (2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/peg/pub 
lications/report/g20reportlowresfinalpdf.pdf. 
 26. Wade Shepard, If China Is So Committed to Renewable Energy, Why Are So Many New 
Coal Plants Being Built?, FORBES (July 8, 2016, 10:11 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wade 
shepard/2016/07/08/if-china-is-so-committed-to-renewable-energy-why-are-so-many-new 
-coal-plants-being-built/#311c97db65f7. 
 27. DAVID CAMPBELL & MANDY CHUI, IMS HEALTH, PHARMERGING SHAKE-UP: NEW 
IMPERATIVES IN A REDEFINED WORLD 5 (2011), http://ficci.in/spdocument/20174 
/PHARMERGING%20SHAKE-UP.pdf. 
 28. China’s Drug-Price Cuts Are Hitting Big Pharma Where It Hurts, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(Mar. 8, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-08/big-phar 
ma-s-china-dream-meets-reality-of-price-cutting-campaign. 
 29. China-Pharmaceuticals, EXPORT.GOV (May 31, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web 
/20170418211316/https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-Pharmaceuticals. 
 30. See, e.g., BOEING, supra note 24 (indicating valuations conducted by Boeing of the 
Chinese aviation market over the next 20 years at $1.085 trillion exceed that of the entire 
North American market at $1.040 trillion). 
 31. It is possible that a U.S. patent may remain more valuable than a Chinese patent, 
even if the Chinese market become more important to inventors than the U.S. market, if U.S. 
patent damages remain sufficiently high. However, it would seem somewhat perverse if 
inventors value patents more for the patent damages they can obtain than the sales they can 
derive from their patent monopolies, and such a consideration should be discarded in a 
justification for the patent system. 
 32. Press Release, supra note 3. 
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Therefore, any attempt to justify the U.S. patent system, as the 
situation now stands, should take into account the near inevitability 
that the U.S. market will be reduced to only one of many markets 
that civilian inventors are primarily interested in. The ability of the 
theories of incentive to invent, commercialization, and race to 
invent to justify the U.S. patent system will correspondingly erode 
along with the economic dominance of the United States. 
The theory of disclosure stands in a slightly different position 
because it identifies disclosure of inventions, not innovation itself, 
as the public good to be achieved by patent systems. Accordingly, 
its ability to account for the U.S. patent system does not lose 
viability simply because the U.S. market has been overtaken by 
others. There is a legitimate argument that the U.S. public should 
be subject to patent monopolies because it is in the interest of the 
United States that disclosures of inventions that might have been 
created and designed for other markets nonetheless be submitted 
to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for 
public examination and research. 
However, disclosure as a rationale is strongly undermined by 
other currents of the modern global economy, where accessibility 
to information has been made so easy. Even in 1986, the Federal 
Circuit considered a German doctoral thesis to be “sufficiently 
accessible, at least to the public interested in the art,” simply 
because it “most probably was available for general use” in light of 
the practices of the university library where the thesis was 
maintained.33 In the modern digital age, the internet serves as a 
virtual Library of Alexandria, where content, once released, is 
accessible everywhere. The days of excavating library stacks for a 
heavy, book-bound thesis are little more than fond memories. 
Consequently, it is unclear why the United States could not rely on 
disclosures to foreign patent offices or to online academic channels 
to gain access to technical disclosures of inventions. 
A disclosure theorist might also argue that there is value in the 
USPTO being an additional, independent source of preservation for 
documentations of inventions. After all, catastrophic destruction of 
patent data is not unknown; thousands of U.S. patents were forever 
 
 33. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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lost through The Great Patent Fire of 1836.34 But with the inexorable 
development of redundant data repositories and distribution of 
downloaded digital documents, it is difficult to conceive of any 
scenario in the modern day, barring a thermonuclear war, that 
patents could be destroyed. And even if foreign patent offices were 
untrustworthy custodians of technological disclosures, the modern 
response to the problem ought to be special funding to the Library 
of Congress to download, translate, and preserve foreign patents, 
not the imposition of patent monopolies on the back of the 
U.S.  public. 
Finally, it may be argued that the United States should 
nonetheless use its own patent system to lure inventors to disclose, 
because the United States would then be able to impose its own 
quality standards of disclosure. However, even if we assume that 
the U.S. disclosure standards are the most stringent, it is difficult to 
imagine that the disclosure standards of the second most stringent 
jurisdiction among the important markets of the world is so 
inferior that the difference is worth imposing patent monopolies 
on Americans. 
Given the inability of the prevailing theories to explain the need 
for the U.S. patent system in a multipolar world where the U.S. 
market is becoming less dominant, it is necessary for us to reexam-
ine what the U.S. patent system should be used for. 
B. Development of the National State of Science and Technology 
as Justification for the Patent System 
At this juncture, it would be proper to consider why the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to create a patent law in the first 
place: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”35 The words, 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” are 
especially significant because, of the eighteen clauses enumerating 
the powers granted to Congress, the Patent and Copyright Clause 
 
 34. December 15th Marks the 165th Anniversary of The Great Patent Office Fire of 1836, 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Dec. 14, 2001), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-up 
dates/december-15th-marks-165th-anniversary-great-patent-office-fire-1836. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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is one of only two that explicitly spell forth the purpose of the 
power.36 And, as the Supreme Court explained, “This . . . standard 
expressed in the Constitution . . . may not be ignored.”37 
It must be noted that the Framers left few clues about what it 
means “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”38 At 
the time of the drafting of the Constitution, there was little dispute 
that patents can serve a public good.39 The insertion of the Patent 
and Copyright Clause into the Constitution was not controversial—
in the words of the Federalist, “The utility of this power will scarce-
ly be questioned.”40 
To that end, it may be argued that the Framers, in using the 
capitalized words “Science” and “useful Arts” in the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, were referring to the Science and useful Arts of 
humanity as a whole. Certainly, the concept of referring to the Arts 
and the Sciences in the abstract has been long established.41 It 
would be tempting to think that the Framers, swept up in the frenzy 
of the Enlightenment, would seek to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts of all humanity by the creation of a U.S. 
patent and copyright system. 
However, a better interpretation of “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts” would be a nationalistic one, that is, “to 
promote the Progress of American Science and useful Arts.” To be-
gin with, the patent systems created in Europe were nationalistic in 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 38. We do know that “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” excludes 
the grant of a monopoly as a political favor or as a revenue generating measure. Colin D. 
Moore, The Power to Regulate Patents and Copyright, in THE POWERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS: 
WHERE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY BEGINS AND ENDS 95, 95–96 (Brien Hallett ed., 2016); see 
also Graham, 383 U.S. at 5 (“This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of 
advances in the ‘useful arts.’ It was written against the backdrop of the practices—eventually 
curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in granting monopolies to court 
favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public.”). 
 39. Moore, supra note 38, at 98. 
 40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 41. For example, the Arts and the Sciences have even before the American Revolution 
been long allegorized in countless pieces of artwork. An example would be “Minerva as 
Protectress of the Arts and Sciences,” by Luca Giordano, a work created in the 1680s that is 
now exhibited in The National Gallery in London. A picture of the work is viewable on the 
website of the National Gallery at https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/luca-gi 
ordano-minerva-as-protectress-of-the-arts-and-sciences. 
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conception and purpose.42 The Statute on Industrial Brevets of 1474 
of the Venetian Republic, generally credited as the first codification 
of patent practices, made its objectives very clear: 
 There are men in this city, and also there come other persons 
every day from different places by reason of its greatness and 
goodness, who have most clever minds, capable of devising and 
inventing all kinds of ingenious contrivances. And should it be 
legislated that the works and contrivances invented by them 
could not be copied and made by others so that they are deprived 
of their honour, men of such kind would exert their minds, invent 
and make things that would be of no small utility and benefit to 
our State. Therefore, . . . any person in this city who makes any 
new and ingenious contrivances not made heretofore in our 
Dominion, shall, as soon as it is perfected so that it can be used 
and exercised, give notice of the same to the office of our 
Provveditori di Comun, having been forbidden up to ten years to 
any other person in any territory and place of ours to make a 
contrivance in the form and resemblance of that one without the 
consent and license of the author. . . . But our Government will be 
free, at its complete discretion, to take and use for its needs any of 
the said contrivances and instruments, with this condition, 
however, that no one other than the authors shall operate them.43 
The law’s explicit aim was to incentivize skilled workers to 
either stay within or move to Venice, bringing with them their 
businesses and know-how, which, in the words of the law, were of 
“no small utility and benefit to our State.”44 The law aimed to 
accomplish this objective by extending patents to “new and 
ingenious contrivances not made heretofore in our Dominion,” 
incentivizing people who made “new and ingenious contrivances” 
outside to bring their manufacturing into Venice. The nationalistic 
 
 42.  Joanna Kostylo, Commentary on: Venetian Statute on Industrial Brevets (1474), in PRI-
MARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (Lionel Bently & Martin Kretschmer eds., 2008), 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_i_1474. 
 43. Statute on Industrial Brevet of 1474 (Venetian Republic), in PRIMARY SOURCES 
ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/show 
Record.php?id=record_i_1474.  
 44. Id. 
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aim was also reflected in the provision that Venice reserves the 
discretion to practice the patent for its own needs.45 
There is simply no reason to think that the Framers of the 
Constitution were unaware of these nationalistic objectives under-
lying the patent systems then in existence. Their silence indicates 
that they sought to achieve the same goals when they crafted the 
Patent and Copyright Clause; had they wanted the U.S. patent 
system to achieve a different result, they likely would have left 
some instructions to that effect. Indeed, President Washington, in 
his first annual address to Congress, urged Congress to create a 
patent system with the following words: 
I cannot forbear intimating to you the expediency of giving 
effectual encouragement as well to the introduction of new and 
useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius in 
producing them at home . . . .46 
The stated aims can hardly be differentiated from those of the 
Venetian patent system to have persons of “most clever minds” in 
Venice and elsewhere come to Venice to “make things that would 
be of no small utility and benefit to our State.” 
The words, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful 
Arts,” must also be understood in light of the very dim view the 
Framers had of monopolies. In a 1788 letter, James Madison wrote 
the following passage to persuade a skeptical Thomas Jefferson 
about the benefits of a copyright and patent power: 
With regard to monopolies they are justly classified among the 
greatest nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear that as 
encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they 
are not too valuable to be wholly renounced? Would it not suffice 
to reserve in all cases a right to the Public to abolish the privilege 
at a price to be specified in the grant of it? Is there not also 
infinitely less danger of this abuse in our Governments, than in 
 
 45. For a description of the English counterpart to the Venetian system, see Paul 
Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An 
Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 370–71 (2002). 
 46. Letter from George Washington to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives 
(Jan. 8, 1790), in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 543, 547 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1993) 
(emphasis added), available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05 
-04-02-0361. 
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most others? Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the few. 
Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to sacrifice 
the many to their own partialities and corruptions. Where the 
power, as with us, is in the many not in the few, the danger can 
not be very great that the few will be thus favored. It is much 
more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed 
to the many.47 
The Framers of the Constitution clearly thought that the public 
granting the monopoly suffers the “sacrifice” so that that very same 
public can derive some direct benefit. 
Within the context of the state of the world economy and 
technology at the drafting of the Constitution, this conception of 
patent law is fundamentally nationalistic. At the time, Britain was 
on the verge of the Industrial Revolution.48 As Joel Mokyr notes, “in 
the eighteenth century the British market was large enough to cover 
the costs of invention,”49 to ensure that there was a minimum 
market demand to support the creation of inventions. 
If the Framers regarded monopolies “among the greatest 
nuisances in Government,”50 then they had no reason to arm the 
U.S. government with the power to authorize monopolies in order 
to promote the Science and useful Arts of all humanity. After all, 
the British and Continental markets already provided sufficient 
reward for this purpose. An imposition of monopolies on the public 
of the United States might add little more than a small boost. That 
the Framers nonetheless added the Patent and Copyright Clause to 
the Constitution implies that the U.S. public stood to gain in some 
unique and distinct way from a U.S. patent system. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider the requirements of the 
early U.S. intellectual property laws. The Patent Act of 1793 limited 
U.S. patent grants to “a citizen or citizens of the United States.”51 It 
 
 47. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 295, 295–300 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977), available 
at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0218. 
 48. By convention, the Industrial Revolution began in the late 18th century. See, e.g., 
The Third Industrial Revolution, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com 
/node/21553017. The Constitution was written in 1787. 
 49. JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC 
PROGRESS 245 (2014). 
 50. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 47. 
 51. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. 
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was only in 1800 that the right to apply for patents was extended to 
“aliens who at the time of petitioning . . . have resided for two years 
within the United States.”52 The cousin of the Patent Acts, the 
Copyright Act of 1790, limited copyright protection to materials 
“printed within these United States” and could be asserted only by 
“a citizen or citizens thereof, or resident within the same.”53 The 
early U.S. patents and copyrights were granted in a time when the 
modern concept of outsourcing and publication did not to exist. 
Patents and copyrights were, in effect, available only to inventors 
and writers based in the United States and limited to inventions 
manufactured and writing printed within the United States.54 
In view of all this, it is hard to argue that the Patent and 
Copyright Clause was meant for anything other than nationalistic 
ends. And, as the United States now seeks to defend what remains 
of its economic vitality and strength, it is worth reconsidering 
these original roots of the patent system as a measure of tech-
nological nationalism. 
It must be emphasized that this nationalistic conception of U.S. 
patent law is by no means antiquated. Nationalism still defines 
some of the United States’ competitors’ views of their own patent 
law systems. The Outline of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy promulgated by the State Council of China in 2008 
envisions Chinese intellectual property law as a strategic lever 
for development: 
 Intellectual property system is a basic system for developing and 
utilizing knowledge-based resources. By reasonably determining 
people’s rights to certain knowledge and other information, the 
intellectual property system adjusts the interests among different 
groups of persons in the process of creating and utilizing know-
ledge and information, encourages innovation and promotes 
economic and social progress. In the world today, with the 
development of the knowledge-based economy and economic 
globalization, intellectual property is becoming increasingly a 
strategic resource in national development and a core element in 
international competitiveness, an important supporting force in 
building an innovative country and the key to hold the initiative 
 
 52. Patent Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 1, 2 Stat. 37. 
 53. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. 
 54. Id. 
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in development. The international community attaches greater 
importance to intellectual property as well as innovation. 
Developed countries take innovation as the main impetus driving 
economic development, and make full use of the intellectual 
property system to maintain their competitive advantages. Devel-
oping countries actively adopt intellectual property policies and 
measures suitable for their respective national conditions to pro-
mote development.55 
The same subordination of patent law to national strategic 
needs can be observed in the account of the negotiations concerning 
the free distribution of patented AIDS drugs in Brazil by President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who frankly admits how patent 
rights stand in relation to political considerations: 
With regard to the issue of patents, I simply believed that the 
unique magnitude of the AIDS crisis justified our actions. Human 
lives took precedence over profits. It was clear that the free-
market system would not be able to provide a solution by itself, 
so the government was needed as a mediator. We tried to reach a 
compromise, offering to pay the foreign pharmaceutical com-
panies what we could. It was less than they wanted, but it was 
better than nothing—which is what they would have received if 
there had been no program at all.56 
For the competitors of the United States, any ideal about some 
universally fair patent property rights means very little in the face 
of raw politics and strategic practicalities. The Framers of the 
Constitution also saw the objectives of U.S. patent law as nation-
alistic.57 Why should we, today, not also look to the patent system 
 
 55. Guojia Zhishichanquan Zhanlue Gangyao () [Outline of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy] (promulgated by the St. Council, June 5, 2008), ST. 
COUNCIL GAZ., June 21, 2008, art. 2, http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_
1023471.htm (China). 
 56. FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO, THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL 216 (2006). 
 57. Interestingly enough, the National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America promulgated by the Trump Administration treats intellectual property as a strategic 
asset that needs to be safeguarded. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 21–22 (2017) (stating that the United States will protect the “national security 
innovation base” by prioritizing the prevention of intellectual property theft through 
counterintelligence and police activities). However, the document does not set forth a role 
for intellectual property laws for enhancing the strategic objectives of the United States 
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to serve the good of the nation? If anything, modern U.S. legal 
literature is unique in its grand, universal conceptions of patent 
systems, without considering the state of the international balance 
of technological and trade power. One must wonder if we have 
dived too far into theoretical ideals and have forgotten about the 
realities of our world.58 
III. A ROBUST WORKING REQUIREMENT 
In the previous section, I argued that the Constitutional com-
mand, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” is 
“to promote the Progress of American Science and useful Arts.” I 
will now explain how the reinstitution of a working requirement 
would help the patent system fulfill this constitutional command. I 
begin with an exploration of the various forms of working require-
ments and proceed to discuss how a robust working requirement 
would encourage the technological manufacturing in the United 
States that is important to promoting American Science and useful 
Arts. I then contextualize the new working requirement within the 
development of U.S. patent law and industrial objectives. 
A. Variants of the Working Requirement 
Prior to a discussion about a new working requirement in U.S. 
patent law, it is important to set forth what is meant by a “working 
requirement.” In the simplest form, a working requirement moti-
vates patentees to “work” their patents by imposing some form of 
punishment on non-workers. However, there are two important 
variables: (1) the nature of the punishment and (2) the definition of 
a non-worker. 
Traditionally, non-workers of patents are punished with for-
feiture of patents.59 However, by the late nineteenth century, such a 
 
except to state that new trade agreements “must adhere to high standards in intellectual 
property. Id. at 20. 
 58. Herbert Hovenkamp has written a history on how U.S. scholars and jurisprudence 
came to move away from a conception of patent law as a tool for domestic economic develop-
ment. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 
263 (2016). In his words, “The result was a patent system increasingly detached from ques-
tions about economic development.” Id. at 306. 
 59. The traditional punishment can be found in the Patent Act of 1832, which imposed 
a working requirement on foreign patent holders. According to the Supreme Court: 
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“use it or lose it” system was considered too harsh. The nations 
have therefore converged on the international standard of compul-
sory licenses, as seen in Article 5A of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention): 
(1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent 
has been granted60 of articles manufactured in any of the countries 
of the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent. 
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take 
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory 
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the 
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for 
example, failure to work.61 
Compulsory licenses, which translate to diminished profits, as a 
punishment for failure to work is a choice wisely agreed upon. The 
proposal within this Article accepts compulsory licenses as a 
proper punishment for the non-worker and will not analyze the 
possibility of harsher punishments.62 
Greater controversy surrounds the definition of a “non-
worker.” This Article will now explore this topic with a survey of 
the various definitions of a non-worker in the patent laws of 
different nations. 
 
[The Patent Act of 1832] extended the privilege of the patent law to aliens, but 
required them “to introduce into public use in the United States the invention or 
improvement within one year from the issuing thereof,” and indulged no 
intermission of the public use for any period longer than six months. A violation 
of the law rendered the patent void. 
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). This traditional working 
requirement is similar to the working requirement within trademark law, which requires 
continual use for rights to adhere. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 
U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair 
competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its 
function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect 
his good will against the sale of another’s product as his; and it is not the subject of property 
except in connection with an existing business.”). 
 60. The words “[i]mportation by the patentee into the country where the patent has 
been granted of articles” is a reference to a definition of the non-worker which targets the 
importers. Champ & Attaran, supra note 45, at 371. 
 61. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A, Mar. 20, 1883, 
25 Stat. 1372 (as revised July 14, 1967). 
 62. For more about the controversy behind the sufficiency of the compulsory licenses 
to punish the non-workers, see Regina A. Loughran, The United States Position on Revising the 
Paris Convention: Quid Pro Quo or Denunciation, 5 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 411, 430 (1982). 
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The most outrageous form of non-workers are those who not 
only fail to bring the patented invention to market but refuse all 
others who want to purchase licenses. An example of such a non-
worker is the patentee in Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag: 
[N]o machine for practical manufacturing purposes was ever 
constructed under the . . . patent. The record also shows that the 
[patentee], so to speak, locked up its patent. It has never 
attempted to make any practical use of it, either itself or through 
licenses, and, apparently, its proposed policy has been to avoid 
this. In this respect it has not the common excuse of a lack of 
means, as it is unquestioned that the [patentee] is a powerful and 
wealthy corporation.63 
There is very little social justification for granting patent mono-
polies for an invention the benefits of which the patentee is intent 
on denying to the public. All forms of the working requirement, 
even the weakest one, target this type of non-worker. Japan, for 
instance, will punish patent owners whose “patented invention is 
not sufficiently and continuously worked for 3 years or longer 
in Japan.”64 
A second category of non-workers are those who actually make 
an effort to bring the patented invention to market, either by 
themselves or through licensees, but who fail to sell enough to meet 
the legal standard of sufficiency. China defines the condition of 
insufficient working as one where “the method or scale employed 
by the patentee or his licensee in exploiting the patent fails to satisfy 
the internal needs of the nation with regards to the patented 
product or patented process.”65 France has a similar definition of 
non-working and will punish a patent owner who “[h]as marketed 
 
 63. Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 427–28. 
 64. Tokkyohō [] [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 83, http://www.wi 
po.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=188310 (Japan). It should be noted that “person[s] 
intending to work the patented invention” must also have failed to obtain an agreement 
through “consultations [with the patent owners or exclusive licensees] to discuss granting a 
non-exclusive license” before the compulsory license can be granted. Id. 
 65. Zhuan li fa shi shi xi ze [] [Regulations for the Implementation of 
the Patent Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, June 15, 2001, amended Dec. 30, 2009, 
effective Jan. 9, 2010), art. 73, 2003 ST. COUNCIL GAZ. 66 (China). 
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the product that is the subject matter of the patent in a quantity 
sufficient to satisfy the needs of the French market.”66 
A third category of non-workers are those who do not, by 
themselves or through licensees, have the invention manufactur-
ed within the country where they obtained their patents. India is 
one of the countries whose expansive definition of non-working 
includes the following: 
[T]he reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not 
to have been satisfied— 
 . . . . 
(e) if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India 
on a commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the 
importation from abroad of the patented article by— 
(i) the patentee or persons claiming under him; or 
(ii) persons directly or indirectly purchasing from him; or 
(iii) other persons against whom the patentee is not taking or has 
not taken proceedings for infringement.67 
Brazil’s Industrial Property Law contains a similar provision: 
(1) The following also occasion a compulsory license: 
I. non-exploitation of the object of the patent within the Brazilian 
territory for failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture of 
the product, or also failure to make full use of the patented 
process, except cases where this is not economically feasible, 
when importation shall be permitted . . . .68 
These are perhaps the most muscular definitions of non-worker 
currently in existence. 
 
 66. CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.] art. L613-11, https:// 
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1959/13723/version/3/file/Code_35.pdf 
(Fr.). It should be noted that a compulsory license can only be granted if there is evidence 
that “the applicant has been unable to obtain a license from the owner of the patent and that 
[the applicant] is in a position to work the invention in an effective and serious manner.” Id. 
art. L613-12. 
 67. The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code (2005), § 84(7). 
 68. Lei No. 9,279, de 14 de Maio de 1996 art. 68, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en 
/details.jsp?id=515 (Braz.). 
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The survey above illustrates that the definition of non-worker 
is unique to each individual patent system and naturally flows from 
its underlying policy. After all, the definition of the non-worker sets 
forth the contours of “good” and “bad” uses of patents, which can 
be understood only in view of what the patent systems are design-
ed to accomplish. The Chinese and French definition of a non-
worker reflects a policy to ensure that the domestic market will 
have enough of the patented products. The Indian and Brazilian 
definition of a non-worker reflects a prioritization of technology 
transfer into India and Brazil.69 
Having reviewed the various forms of the working require-
ment, we can proceed to analyze which, if any, version of the 
working requirement would best comport with the constitutional 
command that the U.S. patent system be used to promote the 
Progress of American Science and useful Arts. 
B. A Working Requirement to Promote the American Manufacture 
of Inventions 
What constitutes the Progress of American Science and useful 
Arts? The proponents of the commercialization justification of 
patents have pinpointed one aspect of it. One of the quid that society 
should seek from the quid pro quo of patent monopolies is the 
products embodying the inventions. After all, the measure of an 
advanced society is partly based on access to the fruits of 
technology. Clearly, a society that uses the telegraph for com-
munication and washing boards for laundry is not more advanced 
or more appealing than a society that enjoys the internet and 
washing machines. 
The proponents of a disclosure justification of patents have also 
identified another important quid: the technical documentation of 
practicing and replicating inventions. A nation could hardly pro-
gress in science and from that basis further develop its economy if 
 
 69. The keen observer may notice that the definition of non-worker used by a parti-
cular nation bears a strong correlation to its economic and industrial strength. On the flip 
side, the lack of a patent working requirement, until recently, was a sign of dominance. In 
1968, every industrialized nation had local working requirements. The only exceptions were 
the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers who were completely domi-
nant in their respective spheres of influence. Champ & Attaran, supra note 45, at 366 n.7. 
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it purchased all the products of inventive genius without acquiring 
any of the understanding of the underlying technology. In recog-
nition of this principle, the United Arab Emirates, for instance, 
aggressively imports knowledge by building satellite campuses of 
famous universities even though it can already afford the most 
cutting edge of technology with its oil money.70 
Similarly, promoting the Progress of American Science and 
useful Arts should also include having Americans work with tech-
nology and science. That Americans merely gain access to the end 
products of inventive genius is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition. We all likely enjoy the benefits of toilet bowls and flat-
screen monitors on a daily basis, but common experience informs 
us that use and access do not make us understand the complexities 
of forming ceramics into toilet bowls or the details of eliminating 
ions in high-tech glasses. 
Likewise, that Americans have access to technical documents 
and invention disclosures is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
of the Progress of American Science and useful Arts. Simply read-
ing scientific texts, even with the utmost diligence, does not con-
stitute a true understanding of the underlying science, technology, 
and real-world practicalities needed for flexible and useful ap-
plication of the knowledge. 
Indeed, U.S. patent law itself recognizes that patent disclosures 
are not intended to encompass all details concerning the use and 
manufacture of inventions. As the Federal Circuit explained: 
Any process of manufacture requires the selection of specific steps 
and materials over others. The best mode does not necessarily 
cover each of these selections. To so hold would turn a patent 
specification into a detailed production schedule, which is not its 
function. . . . A step or material or source or technique considered 
“best” in a manufacturing circumstance may have been selected 
for a non-”best mode” reason, such as the manufacturing equip-
ment was on hand, certain materials were available, prior rela-
tionship with supplier was satisfactory, or other reasons having 
nothing to do with development of the invention.71 
 
 70. Scott Jaschik, International Campuses on the Rise, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/09/03/branch. 
 71. Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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But even if the “step or material or source or technique consi-
dered ‘best’ in a manufacturing circumstance” cannot feasibly be 
captured in patent disclosures,72 such information is still valuable 
knowledge—it is the heart of engineering. And it cannot be 
acquired except from active participation in manufacturing. It is for 
the same reason that legal academia stresses the importance of 
“hands on” classes. Few law students would claim to have learned 
all about the art of advocacy just by reading Justice Scalia’s Making 
Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges without actually writing 
briefs and delivering oral arguments.73 A nation likewise cannot be 
considered to have mastered an invention if the population’s 
understanding of the invention derives only from reading the 
relevant technical documents.74 In order for American Science and 
useful Arts to progress, Americans must have the opportunity to 
work with, delve into, and participate in the manufacture and 
practice of inventions. 
 
 72. The Federal Circuit provides the following explanation of why the best mode 
doctrine cannot be used to require disclosure or updating of disclosures of the techniques 
used in manufacturing inventions: 
[A] requirement for routine details to be disclosed because they were selected as 
the “best” for manufacturing or fabrication would lay a trap for patentees 
whenever a device has been made prior to filing for the patent. The inventor would 
merely have to be interrogated with increasing specificity as to steps or material 
selected as “best” to make the device. A fortiori, he could hardly say the choice is 
not what he thought was “best” in some way. Thus, at the point he would testify 
respecting a step or material or source or detail which is not in the patent, a failure 
to disclose the best mode would, ipso facto, be established. 
Id. 
 73. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUAD-
ING JUDGES (2008). 
 74. The importance of knowledge acquired from active participation in the manu-
facture of technology is reflected in the following account of Saab Aeronautics’ proposed 
deal to sell Gripen fighter jets to Brazil: 
  “The Brazilians want to acquire knowledge about fighter design, and the best 
way to do that is not that we tell them but that we do it together,” [the head of 
Saab Aeronautics] says. 
  “A very important part of our offer . . . is that we are in a situation where 
we can offer them to be part of the development of the Gripen for Brazil,” 
he continues. 
  Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer could become both a local man-
ufacturer as well as a seller of the fighter jet to other South American countries, 
he says. 
Jorn Madslien, Saab Fighter Jet Guns for Orders, BBC NEWS (June 6, 2011), http://www.bbc 
.co.uk/news/business-13641934. 
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 It may be argued that Americans do not need such in-depth 
contact with inventions if Americans continue to generate the most 
inventions or at least pioneer the fundamental science underlying 
the inventions. However, the erosion of the United States as the 
leading innovator continues and shows no sign of abating. Taking 
the number of Patent Convention Treaty (PCT) filings as a mea-
sure of inventiveness,75 we can see in Figure 1 that the share of 
filings originating from U.S. inventors is steadily declining, drop-
ping from 41% to 25% in the space of a decade and a half. It is 
sobering to consider the fact that, not that long ago in 2000, the 
United States had more PCT filings than all of Germany, China, 
Japan, and Korea combined. 
 
 
 Figure 1. Percentage of PCT filings by the country of residence 
of the first named applicant. The graph is created from statistics 
made available by WIPO.76 
The trends in the number of scientific research publications tell 
a similar tale. As seen in Figure 2, the percentage of publications 
originating from the United States has steadily fallen and will soon 
be overtaken by those from China. 
 
 
 75. The PCT offers a mechanism for inventors to simultaneously file applications for 
patents in multiple jurisdictions. 
 76. WIPO IP Statistics Data Center, WIPO: WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGAN-
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Figure 2. Percentage of scientific publications by the producer of 
research publications. The graph is taken from Nature.77 
The United States must seriously confront the unpleasant 
possibility that its technological and scientific dominance is coming 
to an end. And should the day arrive when the United States is out-
invented by its competitors, the least that could be done to ensure 
the Progress of American Science and useful Arts is to ensure that 
Americans participate in the manufacture and practice of inven-
tions that they have not invented so that Americans can gain mas-
tery over these inventions and experience from working with the 
technology. Even if it were less efficient to have inventions 
manufactured in the United States, the resulting gains in employ-
ment, training, and technological transfer might be a price worth 
the cost of patent monopolies. The patent system would otherwise 
fail to meet its constitutional mandate if it imposes patent 
monopolies on a U.S. public that only passively interacts with new 
technologies through consumption. 
 
 77. Richard Van Noorden, China by the Numbers, NATURE (June 23, 2016), http:// 
www.nature.com/news/china-by-the-numbers-1.20122. 
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As argued above, the Progress of American Science and useful 
Arts requires Americans to participate in the manufacture of tech-
nology and by such access gain familiarity and knowledge on 
behalf of the nation. The shape of the working requirement that is 
needed follows from this principle. A working requirement of the 
strongest form, similar to Indian and Brazilian counterparts, 
which targets the non-working patentee who does not manufac-
ture or have licensees manufacture the invention in the United 
States, is an appropriate and calibrated way to give Americans ex-
posure to technology. 
C. Consistency of a New Working Requirement with Developments 
in U.S. Patent Law and Industrial Policy 
The idea of instituting a strong working requirement might 
seem, on the surface, a retrograde move in the development of U.S. 
patent law. It must be noted that U.S. patent law did contain a 
working requirement, from 1832 to 1836, which applied only to 
aliens.78 The Supreme Court provided the following comment 
about the old working requirement in Continental Paper Bag: 
We have seen that it has been the judgment of Congress from the 
beginning that the sciences and the useful arts could be best 
advanced by giving an exclusive right to an inventor. The only 
qualification ever made was against aliens in the act of 1832. That 
act extended the privilege of the patent law to aliens, but required 
them “to introduce into public use in the United States the inven-
tion or improvement within one year from the issuing thereof,” 
 
 78. As seen in the subsequent quotation, the Supreme Court in Continental Paper Bag 
deems this provision targeting against aliens, in effect between 1832 to 1836, as the only 
working requirement ever in existence in U.S. patent law. Most scholars have accepted this 
view as well. However, it is arguable that U.S. patent law always had a working requirement 
from the very beginning. As noted in the discussion above, the Patent Act of 1793 and 1800 
only allowed citizens or aliens resident within the United States for two years to obtain 
patent protection. Patent Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25 § 1, 2 Stat. 37; 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 
318–21. It also had a provision that “every person . . . offending [a patent], shall forfeit and 
pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the 
patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention.” Id. at § 5 
(emphasis added). This limitation, as Herbert Hovenkamp has pointed out, meant that 
“damages were available only if the patent was either in use by the inventor or licensed out 
to others.” Hovenkamp, supra note 58, at 269. These provisions in combination create an 
effective punishment for patentees who do not make or use the invention within the United 
States, that is, they constitute a working requirement. 
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and indulged no intermission of the public use for any period 
longer than six months. A violation of the law rendered the patent 
void. The act was repealed in 1836. It is manifest, as is said in 
Walker on Patents, § 106, that Congress has not “overlooked the 
subject of non-user of patented inventions.” And another fact 
may be mentioned. In some foreign countries the right granted 
to an inventor is affected by non-use. This policy, we must 
assume, Congress has not been ignorant of nor of its effects. It 
has, nevertheless, selected another policy; it has continued that 
policy through many years. We may assume that experience has 
demonstrated its wisdom and beneficial effect upon the arts 
and sciences.79 
Some readers may see a new working requirement as an overly 
drastic change to U.S. patent law, regardless of its ability to 
promote the Progress of American Science and useful Arts.80 
It must be noted that, for whatever “wisdom and beneficial 
effect” there is to the abolishing of the old working requirement, 
vestiges of a working requirement have remained within U.S. 
patent law. For example, Congress has limited access to the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) as a patent litigation forum 
to those who can show “an industry in the United States, relating 
 
 79. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1908). 
 80. There may also be concern that the proposed working requirement would 
constitute a violation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), which states that “patent rights [shall be] enjoyable without discrimination 
as to . . . whether products are imported or locally produced.” Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, § 5, art. 27(1) [hereinafter TRIPS]. TRIPS was a part 
of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
established the World Trade Organization (WTO). Ratification of TRIPS, Annex 1C to the 
GATT, is a requirement for membership in the WTO. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, art. II(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (“The agreements and 
associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 . . . are integral parts of this 
Agreement, binding on all Members.”). In 2000, the United States actually challenged the 
Brazilian working requirement in the WTO on the ground that it violated TRIPS. Champ & 
Attaran, supra note 45, at 380. The WTO never settled the legal question because the dispute 
was resolved in a political face-saving agreement. Id. at 381. It is unclear if the United States 
still holds to the position, which scholars have concluded was dubious in terms of its legal 
merits. Id. at 390. At any rate, President Trump has called the WTO “a disaster” and has 
threatened “to renegotiate or . . . pull out.” Geoff Dyer, Donald Trump Threatens to Pull US out 
of WTO, FIN. TIMES (July 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d97b97ba-51d8-11e6-9664 
-e0bdc13c3bef. The renegotiation or withdrawal of the United States from the GATT is far 
beyond the scope of this article, which takes no position on the matter. However, the 
compliance of any working requirement with TRIPS would be a moot point if the United 
States does withdraw from the GATT, which, as stated above, includes TRIPS. 
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to the articles protected by the [asserted] patent . . . exists or is in 
the process of being established.”81 The availability of an additional 
forum to sue for patent infringement for those who work their 
patents reflects a policy, in the words of the Federal Circuit, to 
“protect[] American industries, including American industries that 
are built on the exploitation of intellectual property through 
engineering, research and development, or licensing.”82 This bias 
toward American industries may not be a working requirement 
with much bite—the punishment for the non-worker is somewhat 
small and the definition of non-worker quite generous to the non-
worker—but it is nonetheless a working requirement. 
In addition, the Bayh-Dole Act, with a stated policy “to promote 
the commercialization and public availability of inventions made 
in the United States by United States industry and labor,”83 actually 
limits the licensing of “any federally owned invention in the United 
States only to a licensee who agrees that any products embodying 
the invention or produced through the use of the invention will be 
manufactured substantially in the United States.”84 It also forbids 
small businesses and non-profit organizations who acquired rights 
to inventions created in their work for the federal government from 
granting exclusive licenses to use or sell the invention “unless [the 
prospective licensee] agrees that any products embodying the 
subject invention or produced through the use of the subject 
invention will be manufactured substantially in the United 
States.”85 When this obligation to manufacture within the United 
States is breached by the exclusive licensee, the law provides that 
the “[f]ederal agency under whose funding agreement the subject 
invention was made shall have the right . . . to require the 
contractor, an assignee or exclusive licensee of a subject invention 
to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license in 
any field of use to a responsible applicant or applicants,” or even 
 
 81. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2012). For a discussion of the protectionist motives that led 
to the creation of the ITC and the controversy surrounding the domestic industry require-
ment, see Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. 
L. REV. 529 (2009). 
 82. InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. ITC, 707 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 83. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012). 
 84. Id. § 209(b). 
 85. Id. § 204. 
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“to grant such a license itself.”86 To the extent that these provisions 
force licensees of inventions owned by the federal government or 
by federal contractors to manufacture the inventions in the United 
States, they also operate as a working requirement. 
More importantly, the Supreme Court itself has developed a 
sort of patent working requirement against non-practicing enti-
ties, the pejoratively named “patent trolls.”87 In eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court held that “[a]ccording to well-
established principles of equity, [patentees] seeking a permanent 
injunction must satisfy a four-factor test.”88 Since the sufficiency of 
legal damages to compensate and the public interest are two of the 
four factors within the calculus of the “well-established principles 
of equity,”89 patent trolls that rely on licensing fees to profit from 
their patent monopolies and that make no particular effort to 
ensure products reach the market will have greater difficulty, 
compared to practicing entities, in demonstrating their entitlement 
to injunctive relief. 
However, even before eBay, patent trolls were already confined 
in terms of the legal remedies they could obtain. According to then-
existing patent law, “When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot 
be proved, the patent owner is entitled to a reasonable royalty.”90 
The patentee needs to show “manufacturing and marketing 
capability to exploit the demand” for the patented product in order 
to obtain lost profits.91 Patent trolls obviously lack the “manu-
facturing and marketing capability,” and therefore cannot prove 
lost profits. 
 
 86. Id. § 203. 
 87. Trolls can be considered a species of non-worker that not only does not bring 
patented inventions into the market but does not bring any goods into the market at all. 
Justice Kennedy provides the following description of their behavior in his concurrence to 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.: 
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing 
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these 
firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its 
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to 
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. 
547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 391 (unanimous opinion). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 91. Id. at 1156. 
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Accordingly, shorn of the ability to obtain lost profits or 
injunctions, patent trolls may be confined to the reasonable royalty 
as a remedy.92 The combined practical effect of these judicial 
holdings concerning injunctions and damages therefore is an 
imposition of something that resembles a compulsory license on 
patents owned by the trolls.93 After all, as stated before, these 
entities are generally unable to obtain more than a reasonable 
royalty in court. And what they cannot obtain in court, they cannot 
threaten when bargaining for licensing fees. Thus, patent trolls are 
compelled, in court or on the bargaining table, to grant licenses to 
non-willful infringers at non-extortionate rates. 
To be sure, this is not a particularly strong form of a working 
requirement. The Supreme Court in eBay upheld the principle 
described by the Court in Continental Paper Bag, “which rejected 
the contention that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant 
injunctive relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined 
to use the patent.”94 Furthermore, the law as applied targets only 
patent trolls, as opposed to non-workers of a particular patent. In 
the words of the Federal Circuit, “In multiple instances, this court 
has held that a party that does not practice the asserted patent may 
still receive an injunction when it sells a competing product.”95 
Accordingly, under the current state of U.S. patent law, non-
workers of patents who are not trolls can still obtain an amount 
greater than that which they would obtain with traditional 
compulsory licenses because they can demonstrate entitlement 
to injunctions. 
 
 92. The value of the reasonable royalty that non-practicing entities can obtain is itself 
limited. As Jaideep Venkatesan notes, “[federal] district courts’ decisions . . . have largely 
denied patentees the compensation that could be attributed to the bargaining leverage 
provided by injunctions” in the simulated bargaining used to calculate the reasonable 
royalty. Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. 
MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 39 (2009). 
 93. As Judge Rader explains in his concurrence to Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., a 
true compulsory license would be one that is issued with the authority of the U.S. gov-
ernment, for example, by a court, without the ability of the parties to bargain for the terms 
of the license. 504 F.3d 1293, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 94. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393 (citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 
422–30 (1908)). 
 95. Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(providing examples). 
 
3.LAU_FIN_NOHEADER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:38 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
128 
Nonetheless, as seen in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to eBay, 
current U.S. patent policy considers “[a]n industry . . . in which 
firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods” as 
a problem to be dealt with.96 As of this writing, at least twenty-
seven of the fifty states have passed legislation targeting patent 
trolls.97 Many patent scholars also call for measures similar to 
working requirements to target these trolls.98 Given this public 
disapproval of trolls, it may not be excessive to also target firms that 
do not use U.S. patents as a basis for producing goods in the United 
States and that do not help Americans participate in the manu-
facture of technology. The jump from the eBay framework in which 
trolls are subject to quasi-compulsory licenses to a full-scale work-
ing requirement targeting non-workers of patents is not only logical 
but is also not as radical as it may first appear. 
Furthermore, a new working requirement is consistent with the 
new U.S. industrial policy to “buy American and hire American.” 
As President Trump explained in his inaugural speech: 
 Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign 
affairs, will be made to benefit American workers and Ameri-
can families. 
 We must protect our borders from the ravages of other 
countries making our products, stealing our companies, and 
destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity 
and strength.99 
It is not difficult to understand why there is a renewed interest 
in manufacturing in the United States. The United States has 
 
 96. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 97. Jonathan Griffin, 2015 Patent Trolling Legislation, NAT’L CONF.  ST. LEGISLATURES 
(June 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/2015-pat 
ent-trolling-legislation.aspx. 
 98. Oskar Liivak, for example, urges that non-practicing patentees be limited to 
nominal damages when suing independent inventors. Oskar Liivak, When Nominal Is 
Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1064 (2015). Interestingly 
enough, Liivak does not see his proposal as a working requirement. Id. at 1062 n.162. 
However, to the extent that it does effectively punish the non-working of patents, his 
proposal is functionally a working requirement, even though it is by no means as muscular 
as the working requirement suggested within this Article. 
 99. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, Inaugural Address, January 20, 
2017, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg 
/DCPD-201700058/pdf/DCPD-201700058.pdf. 
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hemorrhaged almost five million manufacturing jobs between 2000 
and 2016, a decline of roughly thirty percent.100 The result is 
poverty, despair, and an epidemic of suicide and drug addiction in 
hard-hit areas.101 The working requirement considered here, which 
promotes manufacturing within the United States, is entirely 
consistent with the desire to reverse the trend. 
To that end, a new working requirement is a particularly 
suitable policy tool for effectuating these industrial objectives. First, 
because each patent needs to pass muster under the novelty and 
obviousness standards, patents, by definition, involve the man-
ufacture of innovative goods. The manufacture of non-innovative 
goods is undoubtedly important, but Americans should also be 
involved in manufacturing the latest technology. As noted in 
President Trump’s National Security Strategy: 
[T]he American network of knowledge, capabilities, and people—
including academia, National Laboratories, and the private 
sector— . . . turns ideas into innovations, transforms discoveries 
into successful commercial products and companies, and protects 
and enhances the American way of life. The genius of creative 
Americans, and the free system that enables them, is critical to 
American security and prosperity.102 
Having Americans learn about technology through manufacturing 
the latest technological innovations strengthens the United States. 
Second, an earlier study found that, to the extent the U.S. patent 
system “speaks” through patent litigation, the system has little 
correlation with the economic and trade activities of the United 
States.103 The data show quite clearly that patents, as litigated, 
largely implicate a narrow set of industrial sectors, primarily those 
 
 100. Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, U.S. DEPT. LAB., BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES3000000001 (last visited May 5, 2018). 
 101. See Victor Tan Chen, All Hollowed Out: The Lonely Poverty of America’s White 
Working Class, ATLANTIC (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive 
/2016/01/white-working-class-poverty/424341/; Deirdre Fernandes, As Jobs Left the US, 
Suicides Rose, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016 
/12/26/suicide-rates-rise-after-jobs-move-overseas-new-study-funds/yVhFkZOslgnODKE 
jTfcDTK/story.html. 
 102. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 57, 
at 21. 
 103. Timothy Lau, An Economic Analysis of the Patent Dockets of Prominent Patent Venues, 
97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 495 (2015). 
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referred to under the North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem as “Computer & Electronic Products” and “Chemical Pro-
ducts.”104 These sectors involve a relatively small amount of the 
U.S. workforce and of the value added within the United States. 
This suggests that there is plenty of room for patent law, through 
the operation of a working requirement, to stimulate U.S. manu-
facturing within these important industrial sectors. 
Third, a patent working requirement has advantages over other 
policy tools like tariffs105 and public shaming, which President 
Trump has employed or is considering to encourage manufacturing 
within the United States. For example, the working requirement 
avoids the arbitrariness involved in picking specific industrial 
sectors to grow or particular corporations to target.  The working 
requirement is implicated only when someone seeks to bring a 
product to the market and is impeded by the patent of a non-
worker. The operation of the working requirement therefore relies 
on private decisions, determined by market considerations, and is 
relatively economically efficient. 
Also, while the working requirement and tariffs both lead to 
higher prices for U.S. consumers, the requirement alone guarantees 
that higher prices actually contribute to the desired goal of boosting 
manufacturing jobs. Because the working requirement takes effect 
only when there is U.S. manufacturing activity, any increase in 
prices resulting from the requirement comes with some increase in 
U.S. manufacturing. In contrast, with tariffs, manufacturers may 
find it more cost-effective to simply pay tariffs and continue 
importing rather than manufacture the goods domestically. In this 
situation, tariffs end up as a tax burden on consumers. The public 
collects the benefit of tariffs through tax revenue, but there is no 
way to ensure that the higher prices resulting from the tariff system 
directly result in increased manufacturing within the United States. 
Finally, instituting a working requirement, compared to a 
muscular tariff policy, is much less likely to harm the economic 
 
 104. “Chemical Products” includes pharmaceutical industries. 
 105. The word “tariffs” is used loosely here to include trade-related policy tools such 
as quotas, embargos, countervailing duties, etc. Tariffs and intellectual property law are 
closely intertwined. Tariffs are ultimately a measure of protectionism, and intellectual 
property law can, although not necessarily, be structured to act in a protectionist manner. A 
working requirement of the form proposed in this article is protectionist and aligns with a 
strong tariff policy, even though the underlying mechanics are different. 
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position and disrupt the existing trade networks of the United 
States. To begin with, the United States would not have to rene-
gotiate or withdraw from the GATT or, in other words, leave the 
WTO to institute a working requirement. The major economic 
competitors of the United States, who also are members of the 
WTO, already have a working requirement in one form or 
another;106 they would have little room to complain about the 
failure of the United States to comply with the GATT if the United 
States institutes a working requirement within its own patent law. 
Moreover, there is no risk that a working requirement could 
trigger rounds of reciprocal tariff rate hikes, known in the popular 
media as a “trade war,” which may result from a muscular tariff 
policy.107 Competitors of the United States do not have much room 
to reciprocate against a new U.S. patent working requirement 
because they already have working requirements. The most they 
could do in response, if the United States instituted a muscular 
definition of the non-worker according to this proposal, is 
strengthen the definition of the non-worker within their own 
working requirements.108 Indeed, nations like Brazil and India, who 
 
 106. The working requirements of France, Japan, China, India, and Brazil have already 
been discussed. Germany, the United Kingdom, and South Korea all have working require-
ments as well. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBL 1981 I at 1, last amended 
by Gesetz [G], Apr. 4, 2016, BGBL I at 558, § 24 (Ger.), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lex 
docs/laws/de/de/de208de.pdf; Patents Act 1977, c. 37, § 48 (Eng.), https://www.gov 
.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/580337/patentsact1977 
011014.pdf; Teukeobeop [Patent Act], Act No. 950, Dec. 31, 1961, amended by Act No. 11962, 
July 30, 2013, art. 107 (S. Kor.). 
 107. S.K., What Might a Trade War Between America and China Look Like?, ECONOMIST: 
ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains 
/2017/02/economist-explains-2. It can be argued, as of this writing, the beginning punches 
have already been thrown. In January of 2018, the United States imposed steep tariffs on 
imported washing machines and solar cells. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative, President Trump Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Cell 
Manufacturers (Jan. 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-re 
leases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us. Within two weeks, China launch-
ed a trade investigation against alleged U.S. dumping and subsidies of sorghum, which may 
result in tariffs and duties. Sui-Lee Wee, China’s Trade Investigation Takes Aim at Trump’s Voter 
Base, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/china-us 
-trade-sorghum.html. It is possible that at the time of publication the United States will be 
engaged in a full-blown trade war with China, the European Union, and other countries. 
 108. The customary international law concept of countermeasures is, in the context of 
international trade, referred to as “suspension of concessions or other obligations” and is 
explicitly provided for in Article 22 of Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
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already have strong working requirements, would have little abil-
ity to respond. 
Moreover, the United States would not be harmed by a global 
strengthening of patent working requirements. To the extent that 
corporations already choose to establish factories to produce their 
latest inventions in China, for example, the moderate Chinese pat-
ent working requirement is already sufficient. A stronger Chinese 
patent working requirement would not take more manufacturing 
jobs from the United States. In contrast, because the United States 
currently suffers from weak manufacturing, a strong U.S. working 
requirement could potentially bring manufacturing of the latest 
technology into the United States. 
A trade war, however, is characteristically different in char-
acter. In a trade war, there is no limit on the scope of impacted 
industrial sectors and goods.109 Therefore, each nation could 
retaliate against the United States for implementing a strong tariff 
policy until there is simply no trade at all. China could, for example, 
respond to U.S. tariffs on imports of mobile phones with their own 
tariffs on imports of soybeans.110 The result is likely to prove 
 
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. The rule of proportionality of 
countermeasures is captured within Article 22(4), which states that “[t]he level of the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations . . . shall be equivalent to the level of the 
nullification or impairment.” Id. To the extent that a new U.S. patent working requirement 
could be deemed a “nullification or impairment,” any lawful countermeasure imposed by 
other countries must “be equivalent” in “level.” The natural countermeasure for nations with 
weak working requirements is to strengthen their working requirements to match the “level” 
of the new U.S. patent working requirement. Nations that already have strong working 
requirements have no lawful countermeasure. They would not be able to claim entitlement 
to countermeasures without admitting that their own working requirements are a “nul-
lification or impairment.” 
 109. In accordance with Article 27(1) of TRIPS, patents can be granted for inventions 
that are novel, non-obvious, and useful. These substantive limitations mean that patents 
cover a much smaller amount of goods than tariffs. For example, a tariff over beef implicates 
all beef. Patent protection cannot implicate all beef. Patent protection may touch on the novel 
and non-obvious aspects of modern beef production, but it stands to reason that beef from 
cows raised in the traditional way will not be novel or non-obvious and therefore will not 
fall within the scope of patents. 
 110. Other potential targets for trade countermeasures against U.S. tariffs include 
sorghum, bourbon, cheese, and orange juice. Scott Horsley, Kentucky Bourbon, Wisconsin 
Cheese Could Be Targets in Trade War, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org 
/2018/02/21/587379391/kentucky-bourbon-wisconsin-cheese-could-be-targets-in-trade-war; 
Matt Rivers, A Massive US Farming Industry Fears China Trade Trouble, CNN MONEY (Feb. 21, 
2018, 7:48 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/21/news/economy/china-us-soybeans 
-trade-trump/index.html. 
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economically disastrous and painful for certain segments of the 
American population whose livelihoods depend on export trade, 
particularly farmers and ranchers, even if the United States is able 
to increase manufacturing and claim an overall victory in such a 
war.111 New factories for mobile phones might balance out the jobs 
lost in soybean farms, but the transition from soybean farming to 
mobile phone manufacturing may not be smooth or easy for the 
farmers involved. A race around the world to strengthen patent 
working requirements, even if it were to occur, is unlikely to cause 
that sort of economic dislocation.112 
In sum, a new working requirement fits squarely within exist-
ing developments in U.S. patent law and comports with the 
industrial objectives of the United States to increase domestic man-
ufacturing. There is no doubt that a new working requirement 
would be a significant shift within the U.S. patent system, but it is 
certainly not an overly strong prescription to steer the U.S. patent 
system back toward its constitutional purpose. 
IV. MAKING THE WORKING REQUIREMENT WORK 
To flesh out the working requirement, I start from the basic 
form targeting importing patentees as non-workers. That is, where 
there are applicants who (A) seek to manufacture in the United 
States inventions covered by patents they do not own, (B) can 
satisfactorily show that they are in a position to manufacture the 
patented invention in the United States in an effective and serious 
manner,113 and (C) are unable to obtain licenses from the patentees, 
 
 111. Catherine Boudreau, The Trade War Comes to the Prairie, POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2017, 
5:16 AM), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/02/trade-war-rural-voters-000312. 
 112. At least within the United States, patents implicating the “Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing and Hunting” sector, as defined under the North American Industry Classification 
System, constitute a relatively small portion of the overall patent docket. Lau, supra note 103, 
at 501. It is likely that foreign patents will show the same trend. See supra note 97.  The ability 
of a competitor to negatively impact U.S. agricultural exports by strengthening its patent 
working requirement is likely to be small. 
 113. CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.] (INTELLECTUAL PRO-
PERTY CODE) art. L613-11 (Fr.). This requirement is not different in spirit from the 
requirement of the Bayh-Dole Act that any person who seeks a license to a federally owned 
invention must “suppl[y] the [relevant] agency with a plan for development or marketing of 
the invention” and “make[] a commitment to achieve practical application of the invention 
within a reasonable time.” 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(3), (f) (2012). 
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the decision-making authority114 may grant a compulsory licenses 
to the applicants if the patentees have failed to have the invention 
manufactured either personally or through licensees in the 
United  States.115 
A reasonable amount of time sufficient for patentees or their 
licensees to have developed their own U.S. manufacturing capabil-
ities should have elapsed since their patent was issued before 
applicants are allowed to obtain compulsory licenses.  Article 5A(4) 
of the Paris Convention provides a good international  standard: 
A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of 
failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a 
period of four years from the date of filing of the patent 
application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, 
whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee 
justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.116 
However, aside from the basic objective of exposing Americans 
to technology through participation in the manufacture of inven-
tions, a good working requirement must take into account con-
siderations of efficiency and must be designed to prevent abuse. To 
that end, I will propose some modifications to the basic form of the 
working requirement set forth above. 
 
 114. As I argued in the remainder of the article, certain highly technical factors should 
be taken into account in the granting and pricing of compulsory licenses. It therefore seems 
that the USPTO or the ITC would be in a better position than the federal courts to act as the 
decision-making authority. Decisions concerning the grant of compulsory licenses could be 
reviewed by the Federal Circuit, just like other decisions concerning patents made by 
these agencies. 
 115. The working requirement proposed here is, unlike its French and Chinese 
counterparts, not intended to punish a patentee who is manufacturing within the United 
States but is unable to supply the entire market. Small businesses should be given a chance 
to scale up over time, or to fail, without the threat of a larger corporation with superior 
domestic manufacturing capabilities swooping in to obtain compulsory licenses and 
essentially hijacking their patents. The end result may be fewer domestic manufacturing jobs 
created, but, as President Obama noted, “[I]n this new economy, workers and startups and 
small businesses need more of a voice, not less. The rules should work for them.” Barack H. 
Obama, President of the United States, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union, January 12, 2016, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Jan. 12, 2016), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201600012/pdf/DCPD-201600012.pdf. 
 116. Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, supra note 61. 
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A. Threshold of U.S. Manufacturing117 
The working requirement ought not be so strict as to demand 
that patentees or their licensees manufacture all of the products 
embodying their invention within the United States. Suppose, for 
example, a case in which a patentee has two lines of products, 
processor A and RAM B, both of which embody circuitry 
technology she has patented. Suppose too that she finds it more 
efficient to manufacture processor A in the United States and to 
manufacture RAM B in South Korea. It would seem unfair to the 
patentee to grant a compulsory license, on the grounds that she 
cannot achieve 100% domestic manufacturing, to a competitor who 
would then manufacture processor C to compete with processor A. 
We can also envision a situation in which the patentee simply 
cannot manufacture the products within the United States because, 
for example, she cannot source the raw materials needed within the 
United States. So while the threshold manufacturing requirement 
should not be too high, it should not be so low as to allow patentees 
to manufacture only a token amount in the United States while 
importing the bulk majority. 
The approach articulated by the High Court of Judicature in 
Bombay about the Indian patent working requirement, in a case 
concerning the generic manufacture of cancer medicine, is partic-
ularly instructive here: 
The guidelines viz. Section 83 of the [Patent] Act in particular 
states that the patent is not granted so as to enable the patent 
 
 117. The word “manufacturing” is used loosely to refer to the act of making goods and 
providing services and is a strict, technical reference to the “manufacturing sector,” defined 
under the North American Industry Classification System as “compris[ing] establishments 
engaged in the mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or 
components into new products.” Manufacturing: NAICS 31-33, U.S. DEPT. LAB., BUREAU LAB. 
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag31-33.htm (last visited May 5, 2018). Many patents 
are ultimately concerned with activity outside of this sector, and it is improper to lump all 
patents within its ambit. Lau, supra note 103, at 497–98. Nonetheless, the concept of a 
threshold applies to a patent even when it is not classifiable within the “manufacturing 
sector.” Id. at 489. Let us consider, for example, U.S. Patent No. 6,174,237, entitled “Method 
for a Game of Skill Tournament,” which was asserted against Game Show Network and 
Worldwinner.com for offering an infringing online game on their websites. Stephenson v. 
Game Show Network, LLC, 933 F. Supp. 2d 674 (D. Del. 2013). With reference to such a 
patent, the threshold of the working requirement could be thought of as requiring that some 
portion of the servers providing the gaming service, to the extent such service is provided to 
U.S. customers, be based in the United States. 
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holder to enjoy a monopoly with respect to the importation of the 
patented article. Thus it would presuppose that some efforts to 
manufacture in India should also be made by the patent 
holder. . . . Manufacture in all cases may not be necessary to 
establish working in India . . . . However, the patent holder would 
nevertheless have to satisfy the authorities under the Act as to 
why the patented invention was not being manufactured in India 
keeping in view Section 83 of the Act. This could be for diverse 
reasons but it would be for the patent holder to establish those 
reasons which makes it impossible/prohibitive for it to 
manufacture the patented drug in India. However, where a patent 
holder satisfies the authorities, the reason why the patented 
invention could not be manufactured in India then the patented 
invention can be considered as having been worked in the 
territory in India even by import. This satisfaction of the 
authorities is necessary particularly when the [patent holder] has 
manufacturing facilities in India.118 
When or whether the threshold of manufacturing is achieved 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis. It would be impractical 
to set a fixed rule across all industries and across all sets of 
circumstances concerning the needed ratio of imported inventions 
to U.S. manufactured inventions. However, it seems fair that pa-
tentees should be entitled to a presumption of having satisfied the 
working requirement if they and their licensees manufacture in the 
United States at least twenty-five percent of all the units of pro-
ducts embodying their inventions that they sell in the United States. 
Alternatively, the detailed rule set forth in 14 C.F.R. § 1274.911(9) 
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration may serve 
as a useful threshold. 119 
 
 118. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, 47–49 (Bombay HC 2014), Writ Petition No. 1323 of 
2013, July 15, 2014 (Bombay H.C.), at 47–49, available at http://www.lawyerscollective.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/bombay-high-court-judgment.pdf. 
 119. The Bayh-Dole Act uses the language of “manufactured substantially in the United 
States” to regulate the licensing of patents owned by the federal government or by federal 
contractors who created the subject invention in the course of their work for the government. 
35 U.S.C. §§ 204, 209(b) (2012). The law essentially gives individual federal agencies the 
discretion to decide what is “manufactured substantially in the United States.” See id. §§ 203, 
209. To the best of my knowledge, only the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) has promulgated an explicit definition: 
Manufactured substantially in the United States means the product must have 
over 50 percent of its components manufactured in the United States. This 
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Both applicants and patentees ought to be able to overcome the 
presumption by appropriate proof to the decision-making authority, 
governed by the rule of reason. Patentees who manufacture a small 
percentage of their patented inventions in the United States may, 
for instance, be determined to have satisfied the working re-
quirement when large numbers of U.S. employees participate in the 
manufacture of the technology. 
B. Satisfying the Working Requirement with U.S. Manufacturing 
of “Competing” Products to the Patented Invention  
In the real-world, patentees sometimes obtain patents over 
inventions but, instead of manufacturing the patented inventions, 
manufacture other products not covered by the patents but which 
can be regarded as related to the inventions.120 Courts have encoun-
tered this scenario when patentees seek lost profits or injunctions 
based on harm by infringing products to the demand of the 
products they actually manufacture. The Federal Circuit has held 
that patentees can claim both lost profits and also assert irreparable 
harm even though they do not actually manufacture their patented 
 
requirement is met if the cost to the Recipient of the components mined, produced, 
or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the cost of all 
components required to make the product. (In making this determination only the 
product and its components shall be considered.) The cost of each component 
includes transportation costs to the place of incorporation into the product and 
any applicable duty (whether or not a duty-free entry certificate is issued). 
Components of foreign origin of the same class or kind for which determinations 
have been made in accordance with FAR 25.102(a)(3) and (4) are treated as 
domestic. Scrap generated, collected, and prepared for processing in the United 
States is considered domestic. 
14 C.F.R. § 1274.911(9) (2018). The manufacturing threshold within the rule seems to be 
drafted for large and complex products with multiple components, which is unsurprising 
given the role and responsibilities of NASA in space exploration and aerospace research. It 
may not be appropriate for smaller and simpler inventions. 
 120. Reasons for this phenomenon include market dynamics or even mistake. See, e.g., 
Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(involving a patentee that manufactures something it believed was covered by invention 
when it actually was not); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 702–03 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (demonstrating the dynamics of the phone chip markets may result in patentees not 
making all of the products they patented). 
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inventions.121 The touchstone is that the products that the patentees 
make are “competing” against the patented products.122  
These considerations also inform the design of a new working 
requirement. Patentees should not be considered as having failed 
to meet the domestic manufacturing requirement when, for one 
reason or another, they instead decide to manufacture products 
“competing” against their own patented inventions. After all, the 
working requirement is aimed at increasing domestic manufac-
turing. As long as the patentees are manufacturing products in the 
United States, meeting the threshold of manufacturing discussed 
earlier, they have already in part or in full met the goals of the 
working requirement. Therefore, the working requirement should 
permit patentees to show that they have met the working require-
ment by reference to products they make in the United States that 
“compete” against their patented inventions.123 
C. Rights of the Compulsory Licensees and of the Patentee 
Assuming that the manufacturing costs are lower in foreign 
countries than in the United States, compulsory licenses for 
manufactures of inventions in the United States are unlikely to 
concern patentees if they continue to possess the right to import 
their inventions from abroad. Patentees can deter any potential 
compulsory licensees with the mere threat of a price war. Worse 
yet, the fact that licensees must pay fees for compulsory licenses 
means that they would encounter an uphill battle to bring their U.S. 
manufactured goods to market even if their manufacturing costs in 
the United States and the patentees’ manufacturing costs abroad 
were equal. 
 
 121. Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Rite-
Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548–49 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 122. Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1171; Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1360. 
 123. It should be noted that, just because patentees can satisfy the working requirement 
by showing that they are manufacturing products that compete against their patented 
inventions, the competing products are not themselves protected from copying by the 
working requirement. Unless patentees hold separate patents to cover the competing 
products, nothing prevents others from manufacturing and selling copies of the competing 
products. What the others are not allowed to do, under this scheme, is to obtain compulsory 
licenses to make the patented inventions. 
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To give teeth to the working requirement then, it is necessary 
that the grant of a compulsory license come with a concurrent 
entitlement, not to hold the patent unenforceable124 but to enjoin 
patentees from importing their own patented inventions. Such a 
provision would protect compulsory licensees against patentees’ 
cheaper imports from deterring licensees’ access to the market. 
However, competitors of patentees who have no intention of 
manufacturing the patented inventions may take advantage of this 
power to enjoin patentees from importation only to force them from 
the market or to drive up their manufacturing costs. To prevent this 
type of abuse, injunctions against the patentees’ imports should 
start on the day the compulsory licensees’ own tooling and 
assembly lines are ready for the U.S. manufacture of the patented 
inventions.125 This delayed start of the injunctions also serves to 
obviate the impact on patentees when the decision-making au-
thority in the initial grant of the compulsory license misjudged the 
ability or the commitment of the applicants to actually manufacture 
the inventions in the United States. After all, should the applicants 
for the compulsory licenses never succeed in readying their U.S. 
manufacturing capabilities, there is no practical effect on the pat-
entees’ importation at all. 
Once the compulsory licensees begin manufacturing in the 
United States and successfully enjoin the patentees’ importation, it 
would be necessary to protect the compulsory licensees from im-
portation by the patentees’ other (non-compulsory) licensees and by 
infringers. To that end, patents must continue to be enforceable. 
However, because patentees would have diminished motivation to 
enforce their patents in court, any and all compulsory licensees 
should be armed with the ability to enjoin the patentees’ other 
licensees and infringers who import the patented inventions. The 
compulsory licensees should also be permitted to collect damages 
 
 124. Holding the patent unenforceable for failure to work would be a violation of 
Article 5A(1) of the Paris Convention. 
 125. Proof of readiness of tooling and assembly lines needed to obtain the injunction 
against the patentee’s imports should be distinguished from proof of position to manufacture 
in an effective and serious manner needed to obtain a compulsory license. Position to 
manufacture in an effective and serious manner should be demonstrated by such factors as 
the quality of the manufacturing proposal, past manufacturing experience, strength of credit 
line and financial backing, and plausibility of supply chain. Tooling and assembly lines 
will be convincing, but not necessary, proof of position to manufacture in an effective and 
serious manner. 
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from the importers, and the amount should be divided pro rata 
based on the number of units each of the compulsory licensee-
plaintiffs has manufactured in the United States and has sold 
anywhere in the world. 
Patentees should nonetheless retain the right to prevent 
compulsory licensees from importing patented inventions. After 
all, the same concerns about patentees that motivate the earlier 
discussion about the threshold of U.S. manufacturing also apply to 
compulsory licensees, since compulsory licensees may try to 
manufacture a token amount of the patented inventions in the 
United States while importing the rest. Therefore, when compul-
sory licensees do not personally meet the threshold of U.S. manu-
facturing, patentees should be entitled to apply for a cancelation of 
compulsory licenses and for the restoration of their ability to import 
their patented inventions. 
D. Non-Exclusivity of the Compulsory License 
According to Article 31 of the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), where “the law of a Member 
allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the 
authorization of the right holder . . . . such use shall be non-
exclusive.” It is probably wise for a new working requirement to 
comply with this provision of TRIPS.126 
This is necessary, first of all, to protect U.S. consumers. While 
forcing manufacture of patented inventions in the United States has 
the likely effect of driving up prices and imposing costs associated 
with inefficiencies of manufacturing in the United States relative to 
the world, U.S. consumers should not be made to tolerate exclusive 
compulsory licensees who are inefficient relative to other potential 
U.S. manufacturers or who use their power to enjoin patentees’ 
imports to charge consumers extortionate prices for inventions that 
the licensees did not invent. Therefore, other applicants, who may 
be more efficient than the original applicant as manufacturers in the 
United States, ought to be permitted to obtain compulsory licenses 
 
 126. TRIPS, supra note 80, art. 31 (footnote omitted). The need of the United States to 
comply with TRIPS hinges on its status as a member of the WTO. For a description of the 
relationship between TRIPS and the WTO and of the possibility that President Trump may 
renegotiate GATT or withdraw the United States from the WTO, see supra note 80. 
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as well so that they can manufacture inventions in the United States 
and improve market competitiveness. 
Second, that compulsory licenses are non-exclusive is helpful in 
protecting patentees, who otherwise may be forced by this working 
requirement to rely on incompetent compulsory licensees to derive 
income from the U.S. market. By opening up access to compulsory 
licenses to all applicants who can manufacture and market the 
inventions in the United States, the compulsory licensees would be 
forced to maximize their production efficiencies and exploitation of 
the market to prevent entry of more licensees. Moreover, under this 
scheme, the number of products embodying the inventions will 
reach the largest number the compulsory licensees can profitably 
sell, and the patentees will then be able to generate the maximum 
payoff from the set rate of the compulsory licensing fees. 
E. Patentees’ Change of Mind with Regard to Manufacturing 
in the United States127 
The passages above examined the grant of an injunction against 
the patentees’ importation of the patented inventions when po-
tential compulsory licensees demonstrate their readiness to 
manufacture in the United States. However, such an injunction 
does not prohibit patentees from manufacturing the patented 
inventions in the United States to compete with the compulsory 
licensees. Indeed, it is the very objective of the working require-
ment that patentees be incentivized, by the threat of a compulsory 
license grant to their competitors, to begin their own manu-
facturing in the United States. 
Nonetheless, patentees must be deprived of their ability to 
cancel compulsory licenses already granted by the decision-making 
 
 127. It may be argued that the provisions urged in this section violate Article 31(c) of 
TRIPS, which states that “the scope and duration of such use [of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorization of the right holder] shall be limited to the purpose for which it was 
authorized.” TRIPS, supra note 80, art. 31(c). Certainly, the restrictions on patentees that 
persist after they have repented subsequent to the grant of compulsory licenses and after 
they have begun manufacture in the United States are onerous. However, the features 
proposed here are limited in the sense that they are limited to the purpose of ensuring that 
patented inventions are manufactured in the United States. To the best of my knowledge, 
there has not been a WTO interpretation of this language within TRIPS, so it is difficult to 
conclude whether such restrictions would be TRIPS-compliant. 
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authority.128 Licensees who, in reliance on their compulsory 
licenses, invest large sums in the manufacture and marketing of 
patented inventions in the United States ought to maintain the right 
to continue their businesses. In such cases, patentees who change 
their mind about manufacturing in the United States must rely 
on their competitive advantage to compete against their compul-
sory licensees. 
While this is a punishment for patentees’ initial failure to satisfy 
the working requirement, they do have a built-in advantage 
compared to their licensees in that patentees do not have to pay 
licensing fees to manufacture the patented inventions. Patentees 
should, nonetheless, be able to fairly petition the decision-making 
authority to desist from further grants of compulsory licenses to 
more competitors. It should be sufficient punishment that paten-
tees lost their patent monopolies, so the number of patent oligopo-
lists that patentees must compete against should be capped when 
they begin manufacturing in the United States. 
A policy to encourage patentees to change their minds about 
manufacturing products embodying their inventions in the 
United States should take into account the likelihood that patent-
ees will likely not be on good terms with their compulsory 
licensees. After all, since both the potential applicants and the 
patentees have strong incentives to agree to exclusive licenses 
before the applicants obtain compulsory licenses, the fact that 
compulsory licenses were eventually granted implies some strong 
disagreement or breakdown in the negotiations. Where patentees 
are free to grant their own licenses in competition with the 
compulsory licenses from the decision-making authority, they may 
be tempted to grant licenses cheaper than the compulsory licenses 
and spite their compulsory licensees by creating competitors who 
have lower manufacturing costs. 
To that end, patentees, should they be repentant about their 
importation of their patented inventions, ought to be made to man-
ufacture the patented invention in the United States themselves and 
be deprived of the ability to manufacture by proxy in the United 
States through (non-compulsory) licensees. Alternatively, if patentees 
 
 128. As discussed earlier, cancelation of the compulsory licenses should still be 
permitted if compulsory licensees fail to meet the U.S. manufacturing threshold. 
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retain the ability to grant additional (non-compulsory) licenses to 
manufacture their patented inventions in the United States, the 
compulsory licensees must have the power to petition the decision-
making authority to lower the rates of the compulsory licenses to 
the lowest licensing rates set by the patentees themselves. 
F. A Small Business Exception 
A working requirement should also take into consideration the 
practical difficulties facing small businesses that are unable to 
manufacture their products in the United States. As of now, small 
businesses that cannot manufacture products themselves often are 
unable to contract manufacturers that could make their products in 
the United States for them.129  
Until this reality changes, it may be necessary to include an 
exemption within the working requirement for small businesses 
that either have made a good faith effort to contract a domestic 
manufacturer or that, because of their size, cannot reasonably be 
expected to comply with the working requirement. 
G. Relationship Between the Working Requirement 
and Prior User Rights 
Title 35 U.S.C. § 273 sets forth the “Defense to Infringement 
Based on Prior Commercial Use,” known more commonly as “prior 
user rights:” 
(a) IN GENERAL.—A person shall be entitled to a defense . . . with 
respect to subject matter consisting of a process, or consisting of a 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter used in a manu-
facturing or other commercial process, that would otherwise 
infringe a claimed invention being asserted against the person if— 
(1) such person, acting in good faith, commercially used the 
subject matter in the United States, either in connection with an 
internal commercial use or an actual arm’s length sale or other 
arm’s length commercial transfer of a useful end result of such 
commercial use; and 
 
 129. Jennifer Alsever, Smaller Businesses Struggle to Make It in the U.S.A., FORTUNE (Oct. 
30, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/10/30/small-business-manufacturing-usa/ (discussing 
how small businesses seeking partners to manufacture products in the United States 
encounter “frustrating searches, unreturned phone calls, and prohibitive costs”). 
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(2) such commercial use occurred at least 1 year before the earlier 
of either— 
(A) the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or 
(B) the date on which the claimed invention was disclosed to the 
public in a manner that qualified for the exception from prior art 
under section 102(b).130 
It is important to ensure that prior user rights are not used to 
evade the implications of the working requirement. After all, with 
prior user rights, firms might resort to trade secret protection for 
inventions they would otherwise patent. In doing so, even though 
they could not exclude competitors with patent monopolies, they 
could still rely on their prior user rights to continue importing their 
inventions if and when some other inventor subsequently patents 
what they have earlier invented. 
There are two potential solutions to the problem. One is to 
require anyone asserting entitlement to prior user rights to meet the 
exact same threshold of U.S. manufacturing as the working require-
ment. Another possibility is to exclude importation from the scope 
of the prior user rights. Either would prevent firms from abusing 
their prior user rights to import inventions. 
H. Patent Trolls for the Progress of American Science and Useful Arts 
The working requirement with all of the additional features dis-
cussed above is likely enough to encourage firms to manufacture 
their patented inventions in the United States.131 But even with the 
decline of the United States as the dominant economic power and 
with a concomitant reduction of the disparity in manufacturing 
 
 130. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012). 
 131. It seems unlikely that reasonably run firms would risk their crown jewels in the 
U.S. market by refusing to comply with the working requirement. For instance, under the 
current proposal, an enterprising firm could take a compulsory license to not only 
manufacture products embodying the patented technologies of Apple’s iPhone and iPad in 
the United States, should Apple fail to meet the threshold of U.S. manufacturing with regard 
to those products, but also enjoin Apple from importing those products. While this firm 
would need to avoid trademark and trade dress infringement, it could use its compulsory 
license to essentially take over Apple’s iPhone and iPad sales in the United States. While the 
U.S. market is certain to decline in importance compared to other markets, it will likely 
still be of sufficient size to ensure that firms will not lightly surrender to some other firm the 
U.S. profits for inventions that have already been created and proven marketable in the 
United States. 
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costs with other countries, many firms with the capability and 
know-how to manufacture patented inventions will still likely find 
it more profitable to manufacture outside of the United States. 
These firms would therefore have an incentive to collude in 
refusing to apply for compulsory licenses on each other’s patents 
so as to avoid being forced to manufacture in the United States. 
Furthermore, such collusion would be extremely difficult to reach 
through antitrust law, especially if all the firms act silently in 
concert. As the Court stated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
“Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and 
a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point 
does not supply facts adequate to show [antitrust] illegality.”132 The 
difficulty of any plaintiff in finding out the “more” required to even 
plead a conspiracy is such that antitrust law will likely be no 
deterrent to silent collusion. The benefits of the working require-
ment will be unrealized if many firms collude to not apply for 
compulsory licenses. 
This is where patent trolls can be employed for a useful social 
purpose. Patent trolls who do not manufacture their inventions by 
definition cannot satisfy the working requirement. Therefore, they 
would no longer be able to threaten firms that manufacture infring-
ing products in the United States, since these firms merely need 
apply for compulsory licenses if the patent trolls bother them at the 
negotiating table or at court. 
However, the current proposal for the working requirement 
does not alter the ability of patent trolls to assert their patent rights, 
through Section 337 actions in the ITC,133 against firms that import 
infringing products and that cannot apply for compulsory licenses 
unless they satisfactorily prove that they can manufacture the in-
vention in the United States in an effective and serious manner. 
Patent trolls can therefore be exploited to drive firms to 
manufacture in the United States. After all, firms that import the 
infringing products are unlikely to be in collusion with patent 
trolls, which view such firms as prey. And because patent trolls can 
obtain from the ITC orders to have imported infringing products 
“excluded from entry into the United States,”134 firms that would 
 
 132. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). 
 133. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B). 
 134. Id. § 1337(d). 
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like to continue to sell their products in the United States will have 
to resort to compulsory licenses through a showing to the decision-
making authority that the patent trolls failed the working require-
ment and that they themselves will begin manufacturing the 
infringing product in the United States. Moreover, these firms will 
have no choice but to shift some of their manufacturing to the 
United States because the patent trolls have the right to enjoin them 
from importing altogether if they fail to meet the threshold of U.S. 
manufacturing after obtaining their compulsory licenses. Patent 
trolls therefore possess immense power through the threat of 
exclusionary orders to force importing firms that would otherwise 
collude to either manufacture technology in the United States or at 
least create a gap for firms that have the capacity to manufacture in 
the United States to exploit their abilities to take a compulsory 
license and corner the market.135 
The importing infringers, however, may still be able to find 
some way to settle or collude with patent trolls so as to avoid 
manufacturing in the United States. Certainly, in a case in which a 
patent troll holds a patent over an invention that only one firm 
would want to manufacture, the patent troll and the firm could 
agree to a licensing fee high enough that the patent troll would not 
invoke its entitlement to exclusion but low enough that the firm 
would not seek a compulsory license and manufacture in the 
United States. 
This scenario should not be too concerning because the result 
as to where the patented invention is ultimately manufactured 
would be no different if the firm held the patent itself. After all, if 
 
 135. Under current law, patent trolls have the ability to obtain import orders against 
infringing imports from the ITC in Section 337 actions but are confined to reasonable 
royalties from the federal courts in infringement suits due to the combination of eBay and 
Panduit; eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. 
Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978). Therefore, it may be tempting to argue that firms 
are already incentivized to manufacture within the United States by the patent trolls. But it 
is very difficult to imagine any reasonably run firm making the business decision, in 
response to a loss at the ITC to a patent troll, to (A) shift its production of the infringing 
product to the United States and (B) rely on its ability to convince a district court that, even 
though it had manifested every and all intention to continue infringing the patent, the patent 
troll is still entitled to no remedy more stringent than a reasonable royalty simply because 
manufacture of the infringing product is now taking place in the United States. A working 
requirement explicitly allowing firms to avoid patent trolls by manufacturing in the United 
States is therefore necessary. 
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there were only one firm in the world desirous and capable of 
manufacturing the invention, there would be no second firm that 
could meet the qualifications to apply for the compulsory license 
should the first firm fail to manufacture in the United States. The 
working requirement is simply not designed to force the manu-
facture in the United States of a patented invention that only one 
firm can and will manufacture.136 
But in the more common case in which multiple parties hope to 
import products embodying an invention patented by a troll, the 
possibility of collusion is troubling. However, a simple analysis of 
the economics suggests that the decision-making authority, in 
engineering the licensing fees for compulsory licenses, can 
incentivize firms to abandon collusion with a patent troll and seek 
compulsory licenses for manufacturing in the United States137 such 
that the patent troll is compelled to find a compulsory licensee who 
will manufacture in the United States. That does not mean, 
however, that the decision-making authority should always 
compel manufacturing of a patented invention in the United States. 
Relatively simple mathematical threshold criteria can be defined to 
take into account such factors as the demand of the patented 
invention and the difference in the efficiency in manufacturing in 
the United States and overseas, so that a reasonable compulsory 
licensing fee can be set.138 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article examined the rationale of and the practicalities of 
introducing a new working requirement into U.S. patent law that 
would incentivize the manufacture of inventions in the United 
States. It pointed to the deficiencies of the current dominant 
theoretical justifications of the U.S. patent system in light of global 
dynamics and trends of modern information technology and 
suggested a return to a conception of the patent law as a nation-
alistic means to promote the Progress of American Science and 
useful Arts. A new patent working requirement would be well 
calibrated to help the U.S. patent system fulfill this constitutional 
 
 136. It is highly unlikely that such an invention is of much industrial importance at 
any rate. 
 137. See infra Appendix 1. 
 138. See infra Appendix 2. 
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mandate by giving Americans opportunities for meaningful 
exposure to and mastery of advanced science and technology. The 
Article outlined several features that ought to be incorporated into 
the new working requirement so as to prevent gaming of the work-
ing requirement without unduly sacrificing efficiency. 
That the United States will, in the near and medium term, 
continue to lose its lead as the foremost power in the world is 
certain. But with smart policies and decisive leadership that focus 
on internal development and growth, this decline can be reversed 
or curbed. And with its resources and geographic advantages, the 
United States can remain competitive even if the manpower and 
market size of its competitors come to dwarf its own. 
A strong United States that keeps punching above its weight in 
technology and innovation is a goal with broad, popular support. 
President Obama has argued that, for the nation to “win the 
future,” it will need to “outinnovat[e], outeducat[e], and outbuild[] 
our competitors.”139 President Trump similarly stated that “Ame-
rica will start winning again, winning like never before” and vowed 
that the United States will “unlock the mysteries of space, to free 
the Earth from the miseries of disease, and to harness the energies, 
industries, and technologies of tomorrow.”140 It is time for the 
United States to put a working requirement into patent law and 




 139. Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, The President’s Weekly Address, 
January 29, 2011, 2011 PUB. PAPERS 68, 68–69 (Jan. 29, 2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/PPP-2011-book1/pdf/PPP-2011-book1-doc-pg68.pdf. 
 140. Trump, Inaugural Address, supra note 99. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The demand of the market for the patented invention can be taken 
to have the inverse demand form: 
 ! = # − % 
 
where X is the total output. The cost for all the firms manufacturing 
the invention can also simplistically be assumed to be the sum total 
of a component linearly proportional to the units produced and a 
lump sum S to be paid to the patent troll:  
 & = (( + * + +)- + . 
 
where B is the cost of manufacturing each unit overseas, L is the per 
unit fee paid to the patent troll, and A is the difference between the 
cost of manufacturing each unit in the United States and over- 
seas respectively. 
 
Three situations can be considered: (A) a Cournot duopoly 
situation where all parties have agreed that the two firms should 
collude to manufacture overseas and where L takes the value of L2; 
(B) a monopoly situation where a firm is granted an exclusive 
license to manufacture in the United States and where L takes the 
value of L3; and (C) a compulsory licensing situation where L takes 
the value of L1. The labels of L are purposefully chosen so that: 
 */ < *1 < *2. 
 
(A) For the collusive duopoly situation, the first firm’s profit is the 
revenue minus the cost:  
 3/ = 4/ − &/ = (# − -/ − -1)-/ − 5(( + *1)-/ + ./6 
 
Maximization of this profit yields: 
 77-/ 3/ = 0 → -1 + 2-/ = # − (( + *1) 
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The symmetrical circumstances of the first and second firm mean 
that the second firm will produce the same number of units as the 
first firm: 
 -1 = -/ 
 
Simplification of the previous expression yields: 
 -/ = 13 5# − (( + *1)6 
 
The patent troll’s profit is therefore: 
 3=>?@@ = *1% + ./ + .1 = *1(2-/) + 2./ = 23*15# − (( + *1)6 + 2./ 
 
If the patent troll manages to extort all of the profits from the firms, 
the patent troll earns:  
 3=>?@@,BCD = 23*15# − (( + *1)6 + 25(# − 2-/)-/ − (( + *1)-/6	= 29 5# − (( + *1)6(# − ( + 2*1) 
 
The patent troll could maximize profits further by engineering the 
per unit licensing fees, and the patent troll’s maximum profit could 
be solved as: 
 77*1 3=>?@@,BCD = 0 → *1 = 14 (# − () → 3=>?@@,BCD = 14 (# − ()1 
 
(B) For the monopoly situation, in which the patent troll grants an 
exclusive license to one of the firms to manufacture the invention 
in the United States, the exclusive licensee operates as though a 
monopolist. The exclusive licensee’s marginal cost is: 
 77- & = 77- 5(( + *2 + +)- + .6 = ( + *2 + + 
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and the exclusive licensee’s marginal revenue is:  
 77- 4 = 77- 5-(# − -)6 = # − 2- 
 
The total number of units produced is solved by equating the two, 
such that: 
 - = 12 5# − (( + *2 + +)6 
 
The exclusive licensee’s profit would therefore be:  
 3 = 4 − & = -(# − -) − (( + *2 + +)- − .= 14 5# − (( + *2 + +)61 − . 
 
The patent troll’s profit in this case is:  
 3=>?@@ = *2% + . = *2- + . = 12*25# − (( + *2 + +)6 + . 
 
Under the assumption that the patent troll manages to extort the 
licensee to surrender all profit, the troll’s profit is: 
 3=>?@@,BCD = 12*25# − (( + *2 + +)6 + 14 5# − (( + *2 + +)61	= 14 5# − (( + *2 + +)6(# − (( + +) + *2) 
 
The patent troll will again maximize profit with regard to the per 
unit fees, such that:  
 77*2 3=>?@@,BCD = 0 → *2 = 0 → 3=>?@@,BCD = 14 5# − (( + +)61 
 
Since it is rarely cheaper to manufacture in the United States than 
overseas, such that: 
 ( + + > ( 
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the maximum profit for the patent troll in the monopolist case, /I 5# − (( + +)61, is almost certain to be lower than the maximum 
profit for the patent troll in the duopolist case, /I (# − ()1. In other 
words, the maximum profit the patent troll would earn by granting 
an exclusive license for the manufacture of the invention in the 
United States will almost always be lower than what the patent troll 
could earn by colluding with the duopolists. 
 
It is now possible to relax, for the collusive duopoly situation, the 
assumption that the patent troll was able to demand all of the 
profits from the colluding duopolists. Because of the existence of 
the working requirement, the duopolists could threaten to go to the 
decision-making authority to obtain compulsory licenses when 
bargaining with the patent troll if the patent troll unreasonably 
demanded all of their profits. However, the patent troll could still 
point to the licensing fee obtainable in an exclusive licensing 
situation as the minimum acceptable amount from the duopolists 
because the patent troll could obtain that much in profit by granting 
an exclusive license to one of the duopolists. Under the assumption 
that the patent troll secures its baseline in the bargain, each of the 
firms would then be able to maximize its own profits: 
 3/ = (# − -/ − -1)-/ − (( + *1)-/ − ./ = 19 5# − (( + *1)61 − ./ 
 
by structuring the licensing fees and lump sum payments such that:  
 3=>?@@ = 5# − (( + +)614 → ./= 5# − (( + +)618 − 13*15# − (( + *1)6 
 
Solving for the profits each of the duopolists would earn by 
maximizing the profits with relation to the licensing fee yields:  
 3/ = 19 5# − (( + *1)61 − 18 5# − (( + +)61 + 13*15# − (( + *1)6 → 77*1 3/ = 0 → *1 = 14 (# − () 
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Therefore, the profit for each colluding duopolist is:  
 3/ = 18 K(# − ()1 − 5# − (( + +)61L 
 
(C) The case in which one of the duopolists betrays the collusion 
and applies for a compulsory license can now be considered. It can 
be supposed that the other duopolist will respond by applying for 
the compulsory license as well. The calculation is similar to the case 
of the collusive duopoly, and the number of units produced by each 
firm is similar to that from before:  
 -/ = 13 5# − (( + */ + +)6 
 
However, because it would be unfair for the decision-making 
authority to grant a lump sum payment to the patent troll, it will 
grant a compulsory licensing fee proportional to the units 
produced by each firm. The patent troll will not be able to maximize 
profit as in the earlier case by manipulating the licensing fees and 
the lump sum payments from the firm. As such, the patent troll’s 
profit is: 3=>?@@ = */% = */(2-/) = 23*/5# − (( + */ + +)6 
 
and the profit for each firm is:  
 3/ = 19 5# − (( + */ + +)61 
 
The decision-making authority can incentivize the duopolists to 
betray any collusive duopoly by ensuring that the profit for each 
duopolist in collusion is lower than the profit for each duopolist 
after betrayal by manipulating the licensing fee: 
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such that: */ < 5# − (( + +)6 − M98 K(# − ()1 − 5# − (( + +)61L 
 
And in turn, knowing that collusive deals are not tenable, the 
patent troll would grant an exclusive license to manufacture in the 
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APPENDIX 2 
This appendix expands on the previous analysis to determine ways 
to set reasonable compulsory licensing fees that take into account 
factors such as the demand of the patented invention and the 
difference in the efficiency in manufacturing in the United States 
and overseas. 
 
The following parametrization can be applied:  
 # − (( + +) = N(# − () 
 
where α is a positive quantity less than 1. The compulsory licensing 
fees condition that we have obtained in the previous expressions 
can be rewritten as:  
 */ < N(# − () −M98 ((# − ()1 − N1(# − ()1)
= (# − ()ON −M98 (1 − N1)P 
 
It can readily be observed that the compulsory licensing fees would 
be 0 if:  
 N − M98 (1 − N1) = 0 
 
A compulsory licensing fee of 0 would clearly be unfair, so a 
minimum condition for the licensing fee can be defined where: 
 N −M98 (1 − N1) > 0 → N > M 917 ≅ 0.728 
 
By choosing an appropriate α, the licensing fee can be calculated. 
Through the parameters G, B, and A in the expression for α, the 
calculation respectively takes into account the demand, the costs of 
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manufacturing overseas, and the costs of manufacturing in the 
United States. 
 
